October 7th Foresight, Netanyahuu2019s Funding of Hamas, and the Settlers Murder

October 7th Foresight, Netanyahu\u2019s Funding of Hamas, and the Settlers Murdering Palestinians

Источник: https://tuckercarlson.com/tucker-show-ari-flanzraich-041326

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Tucker [00:00:04] How long have you lived in Israel? So we're just talking off camera and I'm, first of all, thank you for doing this. It's impossible to really understand anything from the United States because the filters and the propaganda are just so restrictive. But it seems obvious that October 7th is the beginning of a global reshuffling, certainly of the Middle East. We haven't spent enough time thinking through what that was. What was that?

Ari Flanzraich [00:00:42] I think to properly understand October the 7th, you have to put together kind of a timeline. I think what's been lacking here, I talked to a lot of Palestinians and they tell me a lot about how they portray the war as something that sort of began after October the seventh, which is another problem we can get to at some point. The Israelis chalk it up to the act of a rabid anti-Semite. I have no doubt that he was quite possibly an anti-semitic. You're speaking of? The leader of Hamas is now dead. But it doesn't mean that there wasn't a logic. It doesn't means that this happened when it happened and how it happened for a reason.

Tucker [00:01:20] So just to be clear about what you're saying, so from the Palestinian perspective everything we're seeing now is a result of the events after October 7th and from the Israeli perspective October 7 happened just because they're hated unreasonably.

Ari Flanzraich [00:01:31] Well, I guess what I often find is when I speak to Palestinians and they're not wrong to say that the backdrop of all this is that there has been an occupation for a very long time. We've been occupied since 48, which I understand, but it still doesn't explain the specifics of October the 7th. Right. It explains why at some point something like that could or quite possibly should have happened. And so that's been something that I've focused on a lot and I think if you want to put together a proper answer, you have to put a timeline, you need to go back You have to trace basically the existence and the trajectory of Hamas from the rise to power. But the real breaking point, I'll say, is 2021. What happened in 2021? Three things happened in 2020. 2021, you have tensions at Al Aqsa Mosque. You have famously all the tensions that went on in Sheik Jarrah, where there are settlers taking Palestinian homes in East Jerusalem. That caused a lot of tension. What happened? At the Al-Aqsa complex that year. There were all kinds of clashes between Israeli border police and Muslim worshippers. And this went on for some time, and it was also, it was May. And what happened was that three things happened. Hamas fired rockets into Israel, killing about 14 Israelis. Riots broke out in the middle of Israel, across the country actually, internal riots, between Arab Israelis and Israeli Jews. And suddenly the West Bank woke up from a very long slumber.

Suddenly you had for the first time in a very longtime militants who were firing at IDF troops. I remember seeing videos of, I think it must've been hundreds of Palestinian men. Marching towards the border. Did I think they were going to enter? No. But I remember calling my father, I remember call him and saying, this video I'm seeing, this doesn't look good. This is an indication of something. And in the Israeli media, if you look back at the reports, the Israelis perceive this to be an indication that we have a big threat from within. This contributed also to the rise of the right in the years that followed. So the first order of business was, we have Arab Israelis and they're a problem. We have 2 million Palestinians within our borders. And the next thing that happened, and you saw the borders of Israel problem, within the 48 borders, between the sea and the Green Line. And then you had over the next year or two, you might remember, increased operations by the IDF. Suddenly in Nablus, which used to be called the terror capital of Palestine, suddenly there was a new militia that formed, it's called Lion's Den. Suddenly, in Jenin, the refugee camps in the north of the West Bank, there are armed men doing military marches with M16s and masks on. And that was the second order of business. And the last thing that the Israelis believed was that Hamas firing some sort of like a water pipe rockets into Israel was an indication of something to come, something much bigger.

Tucker [00:04:32] So what was this? I mean, as you said, you could trace this all the way back to the, you know, British Mandate or whatever. You could trace it far back as you wanted, but you think this really began with clashes between both Israeli citizens, Arabs and Jews within Israel, and in 2021. So how did

Ari Flanzraich [00:04:55] that lead to... Not exactly. What I think is that, and this is why you have to go a little further back, sorry, this is a bit of a... I think that the internal rides were absolutely meaningless. I think what happened in the West Bank was somewhat meaningful, and I can explain later why I don't think it had any end to it, why it wasn't going to come to any significant end. But what happened in 2021, why Hamas fired rockets? No one bothered to ask, why are they suddenly firing rockets? Hamas came to power in 2007, I think it was 2007. They come to power and this is a group that overthrew the PA. Right. The Palestinian Authority. The Palestinian authority. They tossed them off rooftops, took control of Gaza. And they came, why would people have wanted them? Or why do they think that the Palestinians deserve them rather than the PA? They were saying, we're a resistance group. We're Palestinians, we were exiled in 48, and the whole purpose of our existence in one way or another is to get back. And so unlike the PA, we're not going to sit and make peace with the Jews. We're not gonna sort of like coordinate with them. We're gonna arrest people at their behest. We're going to fight. And that's what they did from 2007 to 2014. I think you have three to four ground invasions, if I'm not mistaken. And so they were doing kinda, they were fulfilling their promise. They didn't win, they didn't liberate Palestine, but what did happen is that Hamas didn't have a lot of political tension because they were either fighting, being bombed, or people were cleaning up the rubble. But in 2014, just bear with me a moment, in 2014 suddenly silence falls upon Gaza. I think this was a silence that, I don't know if Hamas even predicted such a silence whatever. Come upon Gaza, the Israelis certainly wanted it. It's the last war, it's called suketan in Hebrew. It's last war. The Israelis bombed a bunch of tunnels. There was some ground operations, lots of strikes. And it was kind of this thing where they came and said, look, we sent them back. I think the quote from the general at the time was, we send them back 50 years or a hundred years or to the stone age, whatever it was. But that's a bit of a problem for Hamas. You're a group of gritty, sort of nitty gritty resistance fighters. You came to power. You fought some wars. Didn't win. But you didn't get totally beat. And now you're just bureaucrats. Now you have to go from grit to governance. And that's fine. Maybe for a year, maybe for two, because the next big battle is coming. What happens three, four, five years later? At some point people are sitting there, they have a much lower quality of life than people in the West Bank. Palestinians in the west bank at the very least can come into Israel for years and years and years, half of them illegally in work, make an Israeli salary, go back home. In Gaza, it's, you know, they didn't have a whole lot going for them. And I think at some point in time, maybe around 2018, it became clear that I think People are kind of starting to ask the question is like, what? Okay, if we picked you and you're supposed to fight, and now we're just eating shit here, we might as well get the PA back. And you say that you don't sit down with the Jews, and you don t recognize the Jews and you re not going to make peace with them, but like you talk to them on a weekly basis, you just have some Egyptian guy in the middle playing telephone tag. And I think that the leader of Hamas, I think Yahya Sinwar, I think he understood that I think around 2018, he began to understand that like, this is not a sustainable, this is something sustainable.

Can't keep going like this.

Tucker [00:08:44] When do you think the planning for October 7th began? And what was the thinking?

Ari Flanzraich [00:08:53] Look, in terms of the planning, if you're talking about the concrete steps, look, I'm not an intelligence analyst. From what we know, I think from what was released, we understand that sometime in October 2022, it might have, the real planning could have been underway. The conceptual planning for something of this sort, I had been working within Sinwar since he was probably a teenager. I mean, there's a famous quote. I think he did the interview in Hebrew. Which is like all the more, it's an eerie, it is a crazy interview, and he's sitting on a plastic chair outside and they asked him something about, you know, do you want to kill us? Do you want war with us? And he goes, listen, right now, you're strong, you've got nuclear bombs, I can't, I can touch you, but in 20, maybe 15 years, you are going to be weak inside and that's I'm going to strike you. And in 2018, Yahya Sinwar gave an interview. It's crazy, because I think we were just talking about this before we started. Jeffrey Goldberg of The Atlantic, he put out a piece called Sinwar's Marsha Folly. I think it came out in the summer, August, September, and he ventured an argument as to why Sinwar could have done something so stupid. And I'm bracketing morals here. I'm not talking about whether he was good or bad. I'm just talking conceptually speaking. Like the pure analysis of it, yeah. Yeah, exactly. And he had this line, I must have read this piece four to five times, and until this day I can't understand what he meant. He said something to the effect of Yahya Sunwar fell prey to Muslim Brotherhood supremacy, conspiracy, conspiracism, and he lacked reasoning capabilities. Something out of like a first year.

Tucker [00:10:45] He wrote a couple books in prison, didn't he, in the decades he spent in prison? He wrote one book. One book. A novel.

Ari Flanzraich [00:10:51] Yeah. Something of the road. I forget the name. The carnation and the eagle or something. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Yeah. And he was reading quite a bit. He'd have people, he'd read a lot, sort of like, old- Right. So you just-

Tucker [00:11:00] Right, so he's not an illiterate savage, whatever you think, I'm not endorsing that. He could be a savage. But he wasn't an illitera savage.

Ari Flanzraich [00:11:07] He was definitely literate. Yeah, he definitely had reasoning capabilities. Yeah, you can use reasoning capabilities to do very, very bad things. People do. All the time. He did.

Tucker [00:11:19] That's not the point. So Goldberg's analysis, which is to say, again, Goldberg is not even like a real person. He's like a symbol of the American ruling class as conversations with itself. But he's reporting back to his masters. There's no reason behind this. He's just- I don't know if he was reporting back his masters, like I don't know Jeffrey Goldberg, I don't know who he reports to, if he reports- In the media ecosystem in the United States, that's considered like the highest level of think piece. So I don's know if- report.

Ari Flanzraich [00:11:46] To anyone, but he certainly believes, I would assume he believes this, he wrote a whole essay on it, that this was all just rabid anti-Semitism and a failed, and the worst part about the piece is that he already determines the success. He claims it's his march of folly, meaning he failed. Not only was he stupid and he had, did he have no logic whatsoever, but, he failed And with him, all of his buddies, Hezbollah, Iran, they all failed. And it's over, it sucks. You had a good, you tried, but you failed. In 2018, and this is a very important quote, there was an Italian journalist who's since left journalism, which is crazy to me, but she went out with a bang, Francesca Barri or something. She did an interview with Yehia Sinawad in Gaza, 2018. The interview was later published by Ynet in a Hebrew paper. And it's a fascinating bit. This was, again, if we talk about the silence that came upon Gaza in 2014, this is at the height of the silence, 2018. Not a lot of people remember the wars that happened four years ago. And people are starting to feel a little antsy, a little jittery. Israel's super happy, because they're like, if we just keep feeding them, this will be great. We can ride this way forever. And she asked him this question about the next war. And it's crazy that, you know, Jeffrey Goldberg didn't quote Sinwar once in his entire piece. Seriously? As far, I might be wrong, but I believe that he didn't quote Sinbar once in his whole piece. And there's a plethora of quotes. And they're all very, very useful in trying to understand what the hell happened. And he says, he says something to the effect of, and I quote, The next war or in the next war, victory for Netanyahu will be worse than defeat. This is a guy who apparently already knew that Netanyah would still be in power. You might ask, because the next war is the fourth war. Which cannot be and cannot end like the third, which ended like the second and which ended like the first. And his closing line is they should take over Gaza. Who should take over Gaza? Israelis. The next war is the fourth that can't end like the third, which ended like the second and the first.

Tucker [00:14:24] So for those who aren't steeped in this, why would the head of Hamas want the Israelis to take over Gaza?

Ari Flanzraich [00:14:32] I don't know at that point if he wanted the Israelis to take over Gaza, but I think he was pointing to something that's quite theoretically elaborate, like a very, very high level understanding of how history functions. Sounds that way. Which is... He didn't want them to take over Gaza, but I think he understood that if there were to be another war, that it would be a disastrous war, and that it will force Israel into a corner where they would have two options. Either we destroy this entire place, and or we occupy Gaza. But the problem is that the Israelis already occupied Gaza. They already tried it, and they left, and left for very good reasons. It was economically taxing. It was unsustainable. Israeli soldiers could die, there were RPG attacks on settlements, and I think he understood that he would, in the next war, if there were to be a next war put the Israelis in a position where they would be forced to grope around in the gray for a very, very long time, even if it would appear otherwise from inside, even if it could be sold to the population otherwise.

And along these lines, there is another quote, if you don't mind. About a year before October the 7th, don't quote me on this, but I think a year before October 7th. Sinuada did a speech and he convened the leaders of his factions and various imams in Gaza. And it's like, it's a pretty boring speech and and he has no rhythm and he's screaming way too loud. But there's one point that tons of people have cropped and isolated on Instagram. And he has this line, and he says... He goes, by God, I see it with the sight of my eyes. A regional, religious war that will burn with it the green and the dry. The one that will go on for a very, very long time, even if it appears to have ended.

Tucker [00:16:56] So it sounds like you think that in planning the attacks of October 7th, he saw the long game and understood that it would be hard for Israel to deal with those consequences over time.

Ari Flanzraich [00:17:12] I think, to put it a little more specifically, I think Sinuad understood that the status quo that fell into place after 2014, this long silence, that it was poison for the Palestinian cause. Yeah. The notion of Palestinian resistance. If your cause is that Palestinians should just live, go to work, bring their bread home, then it's certainly antithetical to that. I think he understood that this was poison, and that if he continued on this way... What will the next generation say when they didn't grow up with any wars? How long can you go on putting on marches for martyr children with cardboard tanks and fake RPGs? How long you can go on convening your Imams to talk about the day after, who's going to be the next Imam of Al-Aqsa after we liberate Palestine? How long could you go with the foaming platitudes? It can't go on. And the longer you let it go on, the weaker you get. And I think he understood that one thing was certain. You know, when you shake a snow globe, you can shake it, shake it shake it. The flakes fly everywhere. And the one thing of which you can be certain is that the flakes won't fall in the same place. That's the one you can know. And I think he understood that an attack like this, it's like, it's the 9-11 of this conflict. Yeah. That whatever was before won't be after. And that's why he caught a bloodbath. He rinsed the slate clean.

Tucker [00:18:41] And it's having or likely to have similar effects to the effects of 9-11 in the U.S. It draws the country into all kinds of unanticipated conflicts that weaken the country and cause internal division within the country. Yeah. That'd be my guess. So to that extent, it's successful, it is strategic, and it's effective. In the short term,

Ari Flanzraich [00:19:01] It's been successful certainly and I think in the long term, I think everyone especially Israelis have to wait you know, there's a status quo that dies and There's this notion Israel now that status quo died and we and we immediately established a new one Meaning they broke the last status quo where we had peace and they had we have these little boxing rounds every two years With Hamas or whatever But now we're strong now. We do whatever we want. We bombed them. We bomb them. We bomped in Lebanon we bombed it on we're in control But you don't decide when a new status quo comes into birth. No. That's history. There are millions of variables that come into that decision. Gaza's not even being rebuilt. Currently Hamas has control of, I think, 46, 48% of Gaza. So Israelis are groping around. I think they're entering into probably what will be in retrospect the darkest and most period since the establishment of the state. They're groping around.

Tucker [00:20:01] So, I want to hear where you think that's going and why it is as dark as it's been in almost 80 years, but. Back to October 7th itself. Yeah, sure. So that was, you said you thought it was probably in the planning phases for at least a year. It would have had to have been just given its scale, I would think.

Ari Flanzraich [00:20:23] I think if you also look in October 2022, this is what the Israelis say, I think they found some kind of binder on the border, October 2022 on it. But that was the year in which Hamas repaired their relations with the Shia Axis. That's the year when suddenly you had, I had Hania going to Moscow, they repaired relations with Syria. And that was kind of I think the key into getting the back into the fold with people like Nasrallah. Suddenly you have Islamic Jihad and Hamas are meeting with Nasrullah on a regular basis. I think they were invited to Iran also at a certain point. And I think so those are some pretty serious indications of.

Tucker [00:20:55] I mean, Israeli intelligence being as effective as it is clearly must have picked up signals this was going on. That's already been released. Yeah, so explain.

Ari Flanzraich [00:21:11] I mean, there are people who probably know this better than I, but there was a document that circulated within Israeli intelligence called, I think, Jericho Wall. There was an intelligence analyst, I believe she was a female, who sort of saw what was happening in Gaza. There were certain military drills, certain speeches, and there was an indication that they were planning something really serious. And the story goes that her higher-ups—I think Rodin Bergman reported on this, If I'm not mistaken. Story goes that our higher ups basically said like, yeah, that's cute. It's like inadmissible trash. You had also soldiers at the observation posts along the border who, I don't know when exactly, I don't know if this was in the weeks or the months leading up to October the 7th, but that were reporting to their higher ups that like there was some strange little.

Tucker [00:22:05] It commences and much has been written about and even more speculated about so-called stand-down order or the Israeli government response to it. What's your belief about what happened?

Ari Flanzraich [00:22:17] Are you asking whether or not I think the Israeli higher-ups wanted this to get out of control?

Tucker [00:22:24] No, I'm asking like, what did happen? What do you think actually happened? Why from an outsider perspective, it seems like the response was inadequate. Yeah, it was certainly inadequate, right? Why?

Ari Flanzraich [00:22:41] Look, I don't know, but what's strange to me is that I think it was in the week or two after Tzachia Negbi, who was like the equivalent to the head of Homeland Security, I guess, or the National Security Council, something like that, in Israel, he came out and admitted that I thinks three to four hours before the attack, there are certain intelligence officials and I think the general, like they convened, there was a discussion. It's not like they woke up at 6.30 a.m. So there was certainly something that happened among the highest echelons. One question I've had is why... Wait, do we know what they talked about? No, but there's a quote that circulated in Israeli media that apparently the general at the time got out of bed and his wife was sort of like, what's going on? And he just apparently turned around and said, Gaza is going to be destroyed. That's a call that circulate around Israeli media. I don't know at what time this happens. Could have been at, you know, 629. I doubt it though, because apparently the people were convened before. I don't know. I know what I saw on.

Tucker [00:23:43] Of the seventh. I know where I was. So what did you see and what's your conclusion?

Ari Flanzraich [00:23:53] One thing I'll say is that three weeks before October the 7th, I met with a journalist. He's a British journalist. And he'd come like a year and a half before, and he's starting out fresh. I don't think he knew Israel-Palestine super well. And I wanted to become a mainstream journalist at the time, so I thought he could help me scratch each other's backs. And we would talk a lot about what was going on. And for about a year-and-a-half, I was telling him that something's going to happen, like there's something weird that's going on... And he'd listen to me and he'd help me out. And about three weeks before October the 7th, we met for a beer in Jerusalem. And that was the same day in which the Palestinians, I believe it was three weeks before we're doing these marches of return. You know, when they flood the borders, they throw incendiary balloons, burn some fields, and wait for the Israelis to come back and be like, okay, what will it take you? What's your price? What will it takes you to shut the fuck up? And he asked me, he's like, what do you think this is happening? And I remember distinctly looking at him and saying, I don't know. Because after 2021 or 2022, I believe, Bennet, Naftali Bennet lifted the permit, what you call it, the permit ceiling, as it were, or like the quota to like some 20, 22,000 Gazans receive permits to come to Israel. After years of them not having any. Um, and so usually they would do these sorts of antics to get something. We want construction materials. We want work permits. We want something, but there was nothing really to ask for. And so he, when we said goodbye that day, I remember, I'll never forget this. He looked at me and he said, you know, all right, I think you're a really smart guy. Um, And I appreciate you've taught me a lot, but I just think you've misunderstood this place. I think you're a bit apocalyptic. I looked at it and I said, Tom, I think you've spent a little too much time with the Israelis. And so if I could have come to those conclusions with the limited amount of information I had, I'm sure there are many people within the intelligence establishment that had some idea. Do I think that Bibi allowed 3,000 or 2,000 Hamas militants to enter the country your people a little doubtful.

Tucker [00:26:09] From an American perspective or the perspective of anyone who's visited that border, which I have, pretty secure border looks like, the southern border. So like, how did that happen? Does anyone, let me rephrase, has there been what you consider an honest and reliable accounting of how it happened? Like, how do these guys get in here?

Ari Flanzraich [00:26:33] I think it's known. What do you mean by how? I think physically speaking, people know how they got in. I mean, the border was largely, I mean people were in their bunks sleeping. It was also a Jewish holiday. There was no increased level of alertness as far as I've heard. You certainly didn't have drones or anything in the air, which could have solved this entire problem of course, like 15 minutes. If you have enough guys enough RPGs, enough explosives, you break through concrete.

Tucker [00:26:58] Oh, I know that, but you just imagine that the border with Gaza, when there are, you know, credible intelligence reports, it's something weird is going on. Maybe we don't know what it is, but they would be on, you know, sufficient alert to have stopped this at the line.

Ari Flanzraich [00:27:12] Why something didn't happen between that meeting, which I've heard was between certain members of intelligence at maybe three in the morning, why there weren't drones that were put in the air or a helicopter or heightened alertness, significantly heightened alert, I don't know. But what I have learned over many, many years in Israel is that you would be surprised by what people can get away with. I know people in the West Bank who have fake Israeli IDs, who slip in illegally and stolen Israeli cars to smoke hash with their friends on the other side and then Go back. You'd be surprised.

Tucker [00:27:45] So the myth of Israeli government efficiency is a myth.

Ari Flanzraich [00:27:49] Yeah, I don't doubt it, yeah.

Tucker [00:27:53] So it's not, security's not as competent as people imagine it is.

Ari Flanzraich [00:27:58] To be competent, it's very competent. I mean, if you ask yourself, for example, in Lebanon and Iran right now, how is it that they have thousands upon thousands of targets that are readily available? That's exactly right. It's because they wanted to have them. They set their sights on Iran and Lebanon and they neglected Gaza.

Tucker [00:28:17] Yeah, and that's the central question is why. And so once it's in progress, there is a stand down order. What was that? Why did they do that?

Ari Flanzraich [00:28:31] Well, you can't flood the area with IDF because, look, you're talking about a lot of troops, especially for the holidays or maybe in the north, it might be two, three hours away. So I think it's a bit unreasonable to expect that they would have flooded the whole place with troops. It's harder. People have to get their guns and get equipment. It's logistical mayhem. There were soldiers in the first two weeks of the war that didn't even have helmets. You had Jewish communities that were sending basic equipment because there were massive shortages. The real question, in my opinion, is why, if there was some kind of indication around 3 a.m. Why the Air Force wasn't involved, why helicopters, drones, or fighter jets weren't involved because that doesn't take a whole lot of time as far as I'm concerned. And we don't know the answer. I don't expect to know the answer, at least for.

Tucker [00:29:18] Very, very long time. Once that happened, once those attacks happened, was it always inevitable? The response was Gaza always going to get leveled once that happened.

Ari Flanzraich [00:29:30] If that operation, if that attack were to be successful, and I think if we follow Sinwar's thread, I think it's fair to assume that he knew, well, what do you mean by, you know, that this war will take with it, or burn with it all the green and all the dry? It's called scorched earth. I think, yeah, I there was an assumption that something of this nature would happen. The exact extent?

Tucker [00:29:54] No one can predict. Right, of course not. No. But that there would be massive change, potentially even of borders, long-term.

Ari Flanzraich [00:30:03] Potentially. In Gaza, certainly. I think the talk of border changes, for example, in Syria and Lebanon, I think it's a bit overblown. I mean, it's overblow.

Tucker [00:30:13] Yeah, I have no idea. We'll see. But, you know, things change. I just have to pause and ask what, at this stage, you now, years later, what is the plan for Gaza? The Nanyahu government's plan for Gaza. You've got all these people living there. He said on television this morning, we're going to go with the Trump plan to move them all out of Gaza. Highly doubt that that's going to happen. Well, I kind of doubt that too.

Ari Flanzraich [00:30:43] I think there's this myth that certainly circulates in the Arab world, but definitely here in America too, that there's a whole lot more strategy, that is a whole more foresight in Israel.

Tucker [00:30:56] Yes, people definitely believe that this is part of a plan, greater Israel, this is a strategy. I think you're overestimating the...

Ari Flanzraich [00:31:05] The foresight I wouldn't be surprised if I am not you specifically but I don't think there's a massive plan in Gaza there are certainly plans that have been thrown around but right now as far as you can see and this is precisely

Tucker [00:31:17] So I know that the Israelis had zero, this is a fact, they had zero plan at least communicated to the United States for what would happen after the Ayatollah was killed in Iran. They didn't have a good government in waiting or any kind of.

Ari Flanzraich [00:31:29] Because it doesn't matter to them. Well, clearly. What matters to Israel, what's useful for Bibi Netanyahu specifically, is simply chaos. And the more definition that is given to the chaos, the more he has to account for the shape that it's taken. Right. Smart.

Tucker [00:31:45] The difference between Iran and Gaza though is Gaza is like on your border. So would they want, would he want chaos in Gaza? Well if you look at the border right now, I mean you have

Ari Flanzraich [00:31:55] have, you have a ton of buffer. It's not really bordering Israel anymore. True. So in that sense, I think, and there's not a ton of chaos, meaning Hamas is, I don't know if they're in shambles. I think there are a lot of tunnels that are still left, for example. They have light weapons, they have AK-47s, they like tiny rockets they can sometimes send in. They're collecting taxes, apparently. So they're functioning. Are they a threat to Israel at this moment in time? No, in that sense, Bibi did the minimum he would have to do and still stopping short of actually determining a reality, because then he would have to explain to the Israelis, why did I do X and not Y?

Tucker [00:32:40] So you don't think that there anybody has a clear picture of where Gaz is in 10 years? In 10 years.

Ari Flanzraich [00:32:47] But I do think that Bibi and the administration and the IDF alongside probably have an idea where Gaza will, what they will do in Gaza if X happens with Iran, if Y happens with Lebanon. Bibi is playing sort of musical wars. Why does he have a war? Why did they time Lebanon right now? It's a fail safe for Iran. If Trump decides to pull out of Iran, if Iran doesn't go the way Bibi needs. Then he always has Lebanon. And if all of that doesn't go the way he needs, he could go back into Gaza. So you're suggesting that he has to have a war. At least until he gets elected next, I think so.

Tucker [00:33:31] You really think that's the motive.

Ari Flanzraich [00:33:35] I think there are many motives. I think this is certainly the timing of a lot of things. The strange thing about Bibi is that, look, on the one hand, there's a national interest that lines up with a personal interest. It's not just that Bibi is doing something that wouldn't in any way benefit the national security of the country. I believe that as far as Israel's concerned, striking it on is quite possibly a great idea. You have one of the largest proxy networks in the history of the Middle East. That's bent on doing something to Israel, destroying them forever, I don't know if that was exactly the case. You have a massive paramilitary group on your border with Lebanon. Those are valid, relatively objective, strategic goals. But if you could tinker with them, if you can time them and modulate them to serve your personal motives, well, it's a win-win.

Tucker [00:34:32] So, have you heard anybody articulate plans for just to be totally clear on this, for moving the more than one, probably fewer than two million people in Gaza anywhere.

Ari Flanzraich [00:34:45] No, but I have something else that I don't think has ever been released, actually. I was working with the Washington Post until they fired their whole foreign desk, as you saw. And we were doing a lot of interviews on the day after, specifically reconstruction and trying to follow the money. Because that's what Gaza's about right now. It's all about money. And it's not just American money or Israeli money. It's the Gulf countries. It's Egypt. The PA wants to get their finger in there as well. And I confirm this with two, actually quite possibly three sources, if I'm not mistaken. And this might not end up being the case, but I understood that the center that was put together by the American Army in Kiryat Gat, to map out or sort of strategize about Gaza and assist the Israelis, that they were making calls, that their lawyers were making calls to certain organizations to look into the status of private property Gaza. Basically the thing, among many things I heard that the plan was, have you ever seen the flyers that the Israelis drop in Gaza or the evacuation notices? Yeah. And they usually divide it into sort of blocks, you have numbered blocks and those are private properties, right? Now if you have an entire swath of territory, entire neighborhoods that are upside down are backwards that no longer follow the logic of a grid. You can't expect that some Qatari or Saudi or whatever company is going to come in and rebuild gas identically to the way it was before. No. So I heard that the plan was to have, to sort of like rotate, like take a population from an area, move them away, build a massive complex as it were, it could be condominiums, could be apartments, I don't know what, and then move them back and continue doing this rotation for however long it takes. What does that mean? It means that you are fundamentally altering. The urban planning with the demography and private property of Gaza. If you have a building on a swath of land, on a plot of land that used to have five to seven bits of private property, you have to reconfigure and you have suspend that private property and create a new precedent. I was told by someone very very high up in the PA that this was intended, that there was going to be a suspension of private property for a period of maybe seven years? What does that mean? It quite possibly, and this is the most cynical possible conclusion you could draw, it could mean that- It could mean basically that, look, in the West Bank, sometimes Israel struggles to take certain parts of swaths of land or to build actual settlements.

Sometimes they'll have caravans in certain areas, but not houses. And the reason is that to some degree Israel still beholden to Ottoman and Jordanian legal precedent. And they can wiggle around, you can maneuver, but it can't be nullified. It's very hard to nullify. You see this in East Jerusalem. Exactly. All the time. So what happens—I'll pose you the question, I guess—what happens in Gaza if you suspend all of private property, and you're going to say, in seven years we're going to revisit it, or it will be reconfigured by legal experts who by then will have disappeared? You break a massive precedent. It's just a reset. Exactly. It's a golden opportunity. Will that happen? I don't know. But based on everything I've heard, it is within the realm of possibility. And it makes logical sense as well.

Tucker [00:38:16] So it's a- Did people in Israel take the Trump administration's plan for redevelopment with casinos and beachfront condos, they take that seriously? Like citizens in Israel, people? You think the government did?

Ari Flanzraich [00:38:37] Like, that's not going to happen. I highly doubt it. Yeah. It's still run by a militant group. There's still some, there's hundreds of kilometers of tunnels that have been dealt with by the IDF, which they also lied about. I spoke to a general, his name is Itzhak Breik, have you heard of him? No. It's strange because he's not, I think his English is a little bad, so we don't hear from him a lot in the West, but he was a guy who went on three months before October the 7th and said, quote, there will be a massacre here. This is a guy who was a reserve general who also audited. He was tasked with, I think, for many, many years auditing troops. He worked for the IDF audit, meaning he would go between fronts, between units, and assess troop readiness, routines, equipment. He knew the IDS inside and out, and he worked under several generals leading up to October the 7th. And for years, he was screaming that we're not really ready for anything. We're cutting our ground troops because we want to be a compact, technologically adept army. But we're basically rendering ourselves naked on the ground. And he went down to the Gaza border and he sees that basically the soldiers treat it like summer camp. You have girls and doing TikTok videos. It's like summercamp. It reached a point again, back to the status quo, where Israelis genuinely believed that the conflict was kind of over. This is just, it's going to be this way. There's going be a big wall.

They're going to there. We're going be here. And Itzhak Brik, I sat with him a lot about a year ago and he was telling me that he was getting calls from a lot of soldiers who work in the tunnel units. And I spoke to several soldiers who either worked in the tunnels or were guarding, tasked with guarding them, supervising the work, that there was tons left. Tons left. He said, this general said 75%. I don't know if that's definitely true. But I heard from a lot of soldiers that the material used to totally destroy tunnels is very expensive and perhaps in short supply. And so a lot was happening was sort of sealing the tunnels. You pour concrete inside and it just takes probably some dudes, however many days later to come and undo the concrete, break the concrete. And I also heard from soldiers that Hamas was repairing tunnels during the war. In the midst of fighting, there were tunnels that were being or shafts that were being repaired.

Tucker [00:41:06] There was a big debate in this country about, uh, whether or not the Israeli government sent money, not its own money, but the money of the United States and Qatar to Hamas, whether Netanyahu did that, um, and then it seemed to have been confirmed. Will you tell us what you know about that and what the motive was? What kind of, are we talking about the money?

Ari Flanzraich [00:41:26] That came in before October the 7th? Of course, before October 7th. Oh, the suitcases of cash. Exactly, yeah. Well, yeah, I know that there was tons of cash, I don't actually have the numbers, I forget. What was the thinking?

Tucker [00:41:39] I think it's confirmed now that was considered very controversial.

Ari Flanzraich [00:41:41] There are pictures of the suitcases and the money going into Gaza, yes, definitely confirmed. The thinking was we keep them happy and fat and they don't bother us, which is again the logic of the marches of return. We're going to come, we're going make some noise until these Israelis come and say, what's your price? What will it take to get you to shut up? More money, more work permits, construction materials. It was part of maintaining a status quo. And someone probably soon want to realize that this, if I get too fat, if we get too fat, we won't be able to move anymore. Right. I think, I think it's that simple.

Tucker [00:42:20] So from thousands of miles away, it seems like, but Israel seems like a pretty tough project to keep going over generations because of the numbers, just tiny countries surrounded by people who don't like it or recognize its legitimacy, some of whom are motivated to do harm. So that's like, that's not a good ratio over time, like it's hard to maintain that. It's like, from the Israeli perspective, do people think?

Ari Flanzraich [00:42:50] Think of that? No, but I think there's about, there may be two or three ways of looking at this. On the one hand, there's a demographic perspective, where- Yeah, that's what I mean. Yeah, just the numbers. Yeah. That's one perspective. And if you look at the numbers, so like how many Jews are there in Israel? I think those seven. Seven. Seven million, something like that. You have two million Palestinians who have citizenship. But I think the proper calculation is within the area under control, under Israeli control, What's the population divide? And at that point, you have 50-50. If you take the West Bank, where there are also Jews living, but also Gaza, because these are all areas that impinge upon Israel and which are under Israeli control tacitly, or actually, you have 7 million Palestinians, two in Israel, three in the West bank, two in Gaza, so seven. You have 7,000,000 Jews. It's halved right now, it's split, half-half. Demographically speaking, that is a problem. Do I think that will be what brings Israel to its knees, if it is ever brought to his knees?

Tucker [00:43:55] I was thinking more the macro demographic problem of the Arab world, the Muslim world, almost two billion. So when I hear Netanyahu say we're fighting a seven front war or whatever number of fronts it was seven fronts recently, I think you don't have the economy, you don't have the manpower and you no longer have the goodwill to sustain that for very long at all. Like ultimately, if you have enough enemies and there's too few of you and enough them you're going to lose. People have been saying that for a long time. Well, it hasn't even been there.

Ari Flanzraich [00:44:28] Years. So I think they bet on a few things. They have nuclear weapons, they have a great intelligence agency and they bett on the incompetence of the Muslim countries around them.

Tucker [00:44:42] But there's also a sense in which you can't fight everybody. And so I don't see when I talk to Israelis and just when I watch, I don't see any long-term strategy that rests on real alliances. Like you have to have, this is true, not just for Israel, but for each one of us as a person in this world, you have have more powerful friends than you do enemies or else ultimately you get destroyed. And I don't see that realization at all. It seems almost deranged. I guess we have nuclear who cares if you have nuclear weapons. So does everyone else like so what? Everyone else doesn't have nuclear weapon, but I mean a lot of people have a lot

Ari Flanzraich [00:45:17] people including in your region. That's true. But I think right now you have this logic being pushed around by Bibi, which is, you know, peace through strength. I think the Israelis have this sense that if we push long enough, let's say we do manage to change the regime in Eran, not top of Libya, change it. We can have an arrangement. The Gulf countries, because they've felt very exposed right now, maybe there'll be tension with the United States. Maybe this will also bring other Gulf countries closer to us. There are already tacit relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel. They exchange intelligence among other things, but maybe this will bring them closer. I think they have pretty... Yeah, well...

Tucker [00:45:53] The Saudis have been pushing for this war. Exactly. And in Lebanon. They have the same side as Israel.

Ari Flanzraich [00:45:58] Basically on this question and in Lebanon, what was the aim when Israel wanted to Lebanon in the 80s? The aim was we want to change the demography. We're gonna change the government. We are going to put the Christians in power and make peace The opposite happened. The opposite happens and what are they doing now? I believe that in some dim recess, it might not actually be an active strategy, but I do believe that, in some dem recess Israel would like civil war in Lebanon, because between you and me, if I'm being totally honest, the only way to deal with Hezbollah, Hezbullah is not just a paramilitary group, they are demographically entrenched in the country. They are South Lebanon, and they are the Shiite population that was also oppressed for a very long time.

Tucker [00:46:39] Yeah, and there are a lot of shits in Beirut now.

Ari Flanzraich [00:46:41] It's not just the South, yeah. Yeah, and so I think there is a desire for potentially civil war in Lebanon.

Tucker [00:46:49] For sure. And that, I mean, you've seen this, what you saw in Syria, you know, you've see it in a lot of the same strategy. I'm just saying, and I'm not attaching values to any of this, like what's right or wrong, or even what's good for the United States or any of that. I just think as a general principle, that's day trading, that's like a short-term strategy that doesn't work long-term, but maybe people think it does work long term, or you can do that forever. I don't think you can.

Ari Flanzraich [00:47:13] No, probably not. I think they're hoping that either this all turns out exactly the way they want it, which is highly unlikely, or that you have enough chaos. This is a desire for chaos. Right. That all of these places should be at least uncertain. If we can't determine what the best possible reality for us, then the very least the reality should be indeterminate. It should be in flux.

Tucker [00:47:37] No, I get it. I totally get it and again, I'm not even judging this or that's where I'm, this is not a lecture. I just mean like as a kind of almost a physics principle in the end or over time, chaos is bad for you. It's bad for everybody. It's back to have chaos nearby you. It's to have your neighbor get divorced. That actually increases the chances you get divorced, there's a way in which chaos is a virus and it hurts you in the ending, even though you think you can control it, you can't. That I think that's a pretty stable principle of history.

Ari Flanzraich [00:48:11] I think the big weak point of Israel, I think sometimes when you look strategically or at the surrounding countries, there's another point here, which is Israel on the interior, Israel psychologically. The Israeli psyche. Exactly. I think that, that is the actual weak point. If anything brings Israel to its knees, which doesn't mean it will be exterminated extinguish that it will die as a state. But the thing that will fundamentally shatter the foundation, either to end the country or to start a fresh status quo for the country, it will be internal. And if you want to understand that dynamic, I think you have to look to the West Bank.

Tucker [00:48:56] Well, can I just say this is so often overlooked. One of the only like real genocides in history was the Romans in 70 AD in Jerusalem. And one of the reasons that they were able that seizure was successful is because of the almost unbelievably barbaric fighting between Jewish factions within Jerusalem. Like the Romans got through because the defenders were fighting each other. I just think that's also another principle. It's like, if you destroy, if you don't have a unified country, you're much weaker than you think you are, I guess.

Ari Flanzraich [00:49:27] I mean, yes and no, sometimes I do think about that. On the other hand, Israelis do, at least until now, they've shown a pretty serious ability to just put all of their problems aside. I mean if you look at Bibi's opposition, Yair Lapid, he was asked, I think, two weeks ago about greater Israel and he couldn't even reject that as a political position. He talked about scraping away at Lebanon, which is fine if you're Bibi or if you want to be with Bibi, that's the doctrine. But you have this thing within the Israeli opposition that Bibi has put them in a corner that over the course of the war, they have had no choice but to parrot his speech, to use his language, and he buried them in so doing.

Tucker [00:50:11] No, that's certainly what it seems like looking from the outside. Can I ask about the, I mean, again, this is an outsider's perspective, non-Hebrew speaking perspective, but it seems the core division is religious, non-religious, or it has been, is that still true? Where is that? The idea that a certain percentage of the country doesn't serve, doesn't participate meaningfully in the economy, and there's deep resentment toward them by people who do, that has been true for a while, is still true, is it more true, less true? I think it's where it was.

Ari Flanzraich [00:50:40] A year ago, probably where it was two years ago. Tensions, they rise and they fall. I'm also not like the greatest expert on that, but I think- But you live there. Does that seem like a crisis in the country? I don't think it's reached the point of a crisis. It could. It would. But again, I don't think if you'd permit me to go back to something else, I think you were mentioning the Romans, and it reminds of exile, and I think... What you see in the West Bank, if you're talking about long-term, in the darkest depths of the Israeli psyche, what is going to affect the longevity of the country? It's the interplay, the psychological interplay between the Israelis and the Palestinians. In the West bank? It manifests itself most in the west bank because in Tel Aviv, you know, you have like a bunch of schmucky lifestyle yuppies in Tel-Aviv who just want to forget. Tel Avive is the subconscious of the subconscious, of Israel. Right.

But the West Bank is where the complexes at the bottom of the Israeli psyche, it's where they play out. And so, at the end of the day, you have a strange problem, which is that the Israelis come back, the Jews come back after two to three thousand years as, you know, they were exiles. We don't have to debate when exactly, how many years. But what happens is you have people who have a kind of, not a native right, but a kind of Native claim, who come back in colonial costume. There's a reason why the relationship between the Palestinians and the Jews is different than that of between the Palestinian and the British and the Ottoman, because the Ottomans never came and said, this is our homeland, we're coming back, now it's all ours, nor did the British. That's what the Israelis did, that's what Jews did. And again, I don't wanna debate sort of like what is right or what is clean. I think by and large, it's fair to say that the Jews have some kind of relationship with the land. Meaning there are many Palestinian villages that you could trace their names back to Jewish ancient settlements. Does it mean that an Israeli or a Jew can come and take it? No, but what it does mean is that you can't understand the conflict between the Israelis or the Jews and the Palestinians without realizing that this is a struggle for nativity. And that in some way, they are the mirror images of each other. And in many ways, the Palestinians are the new Jews. And neither one really wants to admit it, especially the Israelis. And so in the West Bank, I've been in the west bank a lot the last year.

Tucker [00:53:08] New Jews in what sense? The people who have the moral authority of victimhood? Like the world looks at them and says, we feel sorry for you. You've been mistreated. Not about that.

Ari Flanzraich [00:53:15] It's a tale of exile and nostalgia. The difference is that the Palestinians are exiled on their own land, which also makes it very hard for the Israelis to deal with this problem. For them, it's a problem. We have people, I always say to Jews, to Israelis in Israel, I'm like, look, if you guys, if the Jews came back after 2 to 3,000 years and didn't forget that there were series of forgetting. Why do you think that the Palestinians won't do the same? And they're right on the borders, they can see it. Couldn't see Israel from Europe, but you can see from Gaza, you can see it from the West Bank. What do they say when you say that? Should they just go silent? They don't want to understand. There's a point. The problem in Israel is that I used to have a lot of, I used to some Israeli sort of religious friends who would come to my dorm when I'd have my Arab friends with me and we'd have some really nice conversations. They even befriended each other. But at some point, my Israeli friends stopped speaking to them. Because there's a point in any Israeli dialog, there's point at which an Israeli has to make a decision, left or right. Am I going, if I go down this path and really try to understand the other side, I risk exposing certain things with the grounds of my own identity here, but the foundations of the country that risk my identity. And the other option is I'm just going to stop it here, turn around and forget this happened.

In the West Bank right now, there's some very, very weird trends. You have, you know, the number of outposts in the West bank has increased. I don't know by how many, hundreds of out posts. Almost every other hill in the west bank has a shack on it. The scale is insane. And I visit some of these outpost and what you see is a little bit of a strange thing. You have something called the Hilltop Youth. Have you heard of this? Of course. So this is like the third mutation of settlers. The first settlers were kind of like kibbutznik people, right? What's their goal? The goal of the kibputznik is, I need to revive some kind of relationship with the land. The first generation settlers were not going down the hill and like pug roaming people. They had their hill.

Tucker [00:55:35] Either barbed wire, or have your shacks intergrated. Self-improvement seemed like one of the main goals of the first, of the kibbutz generation. Yeah, we're gonna like improve ourselves by making it green and growing things. I think a lot of it.

Ari Flanzraich [00:55:47] Also had to deal with the exile thing that we haven't been here. It's like a prisoner who comes home after 30 years, walks into the kitchen, sees his wife and kid and says like, Hey honey, how you doing? Sits down as if nothing happened. That was the desire, you know, but there's 30 years to make up for in this case, you have two or 3000 years to makeup for. So part of the kibbutzik ideologically was like we have to revive some sort of connection with the land. But my point is that the third mutation of the settlers, which is now the hilltop youth. They're strange. I mean, they now wear Palestinian kofis, the Palestinian headdress that Atta Fatt used to wear. They're wearing those things. Black ones. The white and black with the Palestinian ones, which is kind of strange because if you even dressed up for Halloween like that in Tel Aviv, people would say things. People are very sensitive. It's a symbol of terrorism in Israel. And you have the settlers running around, throwing stones, wearing the very thing that once frightened them as children. And you have another trend which is now they want donkeys or there's a lot of shepherding, but with machine guns. Or you have, you know, settler chic, which are like young outpost women who are what they call Israelite fashion.

Tucker [00:56:59] Go. You see where I'm going. Be more specific. For those of us who live in the United States, what's Israelite fashion?

Ari Flanzraich [00:57:05] It's kind of like in Hebrew, they use words like sort of villagey, Israelite or pastoral, which is also the word in Hebrew used to describe the vibe you get in areas that used to have Palestinian villages that are now either forests or towns, lots of wild, natural shrubbery and foliage. The point being is that what you see in the West Bank now is an attempt to double down on Nativity. And so I was in a Palestinian village, it's called Turmoz Ayah, it gets attacked quite a bit. I don't know if you saw, there was a report maybe six months ago, if I'm not mistaken, of like 3,000 to 4,000 olive trees that were cut down in the West Bank. It was a big story. And I was there when this happened, that weekend by chance. And I remember sitting with one of these Palestinian guys and we were attacked by settlers once and they went back, they burned about four houses down right in front of me. I saw it, they stabbed a bunch of sheep. It's the first time I ever saw this with my eyes, saw videos all the time, but I actually saw the smoke billowing out of the houses. And the guy said something pretty interesting. He looked at me and he was very calm and he said, you know, they want, they wanted all that once. I was like, what do you mean? He goes, he goes, you, they kind of want to be like us, you they want they want shepherd, but they also have machine guns. And they want the olive trees, but they don't see that we pave our roads around the olive trees. They want it all at once, they want to slice the mountain, get the barbed wire on, you put your houses there. They want to compensate for 3,000 years, they wanna get back to some point where they were 3,00 years ago. They want all that once, and they want it now, and don't want anyone to be there to disturb them. And so it puts the settlement movement into a strangely, I'd call it an autoimmune Position. Sort of autoimmune, because these people are simply taking hill after hill after hill, hoping that there will come a day, one fine morning, when they wake up and it's empty and they have quiet. But even when that happens, they don't have enough people to populate it. People don't want to live in the West Bank. Why? The average Israeli does not want to be sitting on a hilltop surrounded by Palestinians. The average israeli wants to, you know, sit in Tel Aviv, blacks, maybe smoke a joint, make money, buy a house in Greece.

Tucker [00:59:33] The keffiyeh is very confusing to me. Settlers dressing as Palestinians. So is the message, we're the real Palestinians?

Ari Flanzraich [00:59:41] I think what's going on is subconscious. I don't think they're actually conscious of it, because I went to a settlement, I went a fresh outpost a few weeks ago. I'm surprised they let me in. Someone pulled a gun on me when I went in, and then they realized, my name's Aryeh Chaim Flanzerash, and they're like, oh, you're all right, come in. And we got to talking and this guy's wife is one of these settler chic influencers. And I wanted to talk to her about the fashion. I wanted her to hear like, how do you explain this so that I could then put it into a piece? And her husband is also sort of this lumberjack guy. He's got blue eyes, dirty blonde hair. He's like towing the fields, which I'm pretty sure belong to people just down the hill. And where are they from originally? One of them is actually from the West Bank, was born in another settlement in the West Bank, and I believe she is from somewhere inside Israel, maybe Jerusalem, but I might be wrong. Times of Israel did a piece on her, actually, like a week before I was there. And they got real weird with me. Real weird. They asked like, what do you want? I was like, I'm just here to talk about fashion. And then her husband gave her a look. She walked off, went completely silent, and he sat down with me alongside the guy who pull this gun on me, and the guy's kinda looking at me like who? Who are you? What do you want? I was like, I'm a journalist. He said, can I see your work? I said, yeah.

I write about like security matters. This is for a magazine piece. Long story short, they kicked me out. They said you should probably get out of here. And when I went outside to smoke a cigarette before leaving, the guy who pulled his gun on me is just sitting there and I said can I ask you a question? He goes, yeah, I said why can't we have a conversation? Because I told them, like, I'm wondering about this nativity thing, and the guy looked at me and he was kind of, he knew something was off, because he's like, it's not that many people who do that. And I was like, the fact that you know it, that you're aware of it, probably means that I triggered him a little bit, and when we're outside smoking a cigarette, I asked him, why can't we talk? He goes, you know what? It could have gone a lot worse for you today. I was, what do you mean? He goes. You know what I mean. I said, are you threatening me? He said, no, but there are people who would do a serious number on you. And I said, even to a fellow Jew, and he said, it's beyond ideology. He said, this is beyond ideology, and I spent the whole car ride home thinking about what he could have possibly meant by that. What is it about then? When he said, this is beyond ideology, and I already laid out sort of like the nativity dynamics, but within the settlement movement, what could he possibly mean by this is Beyond Ideology? I haven't defend, are these religious people? That's another question about the settlers in the West Bank. They're not entirely religious. You know, you have a lot of religious, there are religious people. There's also a lot of people who aren't that devout or pious that religion in certain cases becomes a kind of esthetic thing or a vehicle for sort of nationalistic ends. I mean the settlement that I was in with this sort of the settler fashionista, a week after she had a DJ at the outpost, it's an outpost there's two people living there, it's a shack, a DJ and a bunch of women dressed in Israelite clothing doing a meditative been like. Like trans disco kind of like party. What? Yeah, it was kind of strange.

Tucker [01:03:01] So I'm having trouble fitting this into a category. So the two motives that you always hear here in the US or when I've been in Israel are either these are, you know, religious people who are sort of acting out some kind of millennialist vision, or they're people who want cheaper housing and housing in Israel. Those are two separate categories of settler. Right, but you're describing a third category that's kind of like cosplay, kind of, like, what are you describing? Why are they doing this?

Ari Flanzraich [01:03:29] What I'm describing is a part of the broader category of settlers who are there to, at the forefront, who are forwarding, who're pushing the settlement forward, as opposed to the people on cheap housing who just literally go into Tel Aviv, you know, work No, I got it. I've seen that. Yeah. Um, where it all comes from, I-

Tucker [01:03:48] don't know but I think that it's a big commitment to move to a hill top surrounded by concertina wire like you don't do that by accident.

Ari Flanzraich [01:03:56] But if you're a 14, 15, 16, 17 years old, if you in your early 20s, you want to be king of the hill? Want to play cowboy? Yeah. So is that what you think it is? I think in many cases, again, like the hilltop youth, I found them once, you know, these snot-nosed BDIs, like kids with their heads shaved driving a stolen Palestinian car on the Sabbath, tell me to get the fuck out or I'm going to get beat. Like, it's fucking weird.

Tucker [01:04:23] Where, where?

Ari Flanzraich [01:04:25] Israeli authorities, sometimes absent, sometimes present, and even when they're present they can be quite absent.

Tucker [01:04:35] If I'm running Israel, I'm paying close attention to these people because they could be a threat to me. Armed people who are increasingly radical and nobody's kind of controlling their behavior, they could form a militia and overthrow my government. That would be my thought. If I were Netanyahu, I'd be worried about them.

Ari Flanzraich [01:04:56] I've thought about that quite a few times. I mean, there's a few things going on here, right? In the security establishment in Israel, there are a lot of voices who are very concerned. And this is just what you hear publicly. You can imagine that behind closed doors, there's lot more talk. They are concerned. Bibi, in order for his coalition, also has to keep serving them whatever they want. The real problem in the West Bank is that you have these guys who are armed and that you had Abraham on the other day. And he said that, I believe that at some point or another, the settlements will be collapsed. I would agree with him. But the question is not whether or not they'll be collapsed, the question, is what is gonna have to happen for that to happen? What will happen on the way, before you reach that point where the settlements are collapsed? Will it be some sort of civil chaos? Will it a third Intifada?

There's a lot of talk in Israel, but a third intifada. But my sense is that what happens next is not something that follows the sequence of intifadas, But you know, kind of like what happened in Gaza, this shattering of the status quo, I think there will come a point where something analogous, logically speaking, happens in the West Bank. Will it look like Gaza? Not at all. But will it be equally as cataclysmic, maybe? Quite possibly. That's my sense.

Tucker [01:06:16] But I mean, there's, it's a different dynamic in the West Bank. I mean isn't it? I mean it's first of all, it was richer than Gaza ever was. It's more kind of established series of towns, which is why, oh, in terms of the settlements, you mean? No, no, no. The Palestinian population in the west bank. I don't know. It's just harder to imagine something like that happening there.

Ari Flanzraich [01:06:39] Because I don't think, as I said, I don't think what happens there is going to look like or be like what happened in Gaza. But I think, if you permit me a few minutes, there's a reason why October the 7th came from Gaza and not from the West Bank. I spent last summer, I was in the Janine refugee camp, if you've heard of it.

Tucker [01:06:59] Of course.

Ari Flanzraich [01:07:00] And I sat with the, who was then the leader of Islamic Jihad, he was the Amir, the prince of Islamic jihad. I sat out with a few other guys from the various other factions. And what I understood was that the resistance in the West Bank, basically there's a thread going all the way back to 48. You're exiled and you want to get back and you wanna fight. And then there is serious amounts of terrorist attacks. And then eventually there's a political process. And you'd assume that any resistance movements or any kind of, you know, terrorist operator, whatever you want to call it, that they would eventually want to yield some kind of political outcome. But Oslo eventually fails. You have the first intifada, you have the second, and the second intifade is basically a lashing out, meaning the thread has reached its end. And the West Bank at that point was faced with, the factions in the West bank were faced with sort of two options. Either we pause and take a breath and figure out what the fuck we're doing here. We're just going to keep shooting aimlessly, just like shooting to make it look like we're doing something. We're going to do military marches, we're going to act really cool. But the guys are just like hood boys. They're just putting on headbands and like with a Marlboro red in their mouths and just shooting, usually not even to hit. The aim is usually just to die. The logic of the camps, the logic of the resistance in the West Bank is completely backwards, which means I don't think there's to be like an October 7th in the West Bank. But when I was in these villages that were getting attacked by the settlers, there's one line that kept coming up. And I'm talking about a line I was hearing from your average Palestinian farmer or peasant, which was, there will come a day. There will come day when we are pushed a little too far. And at that point, the question is, how many minutes does it take for a bunch of people to run up to a hill and maybe overwhelm the settlement? An old man told me that we're going to chew them like dogs. I would think that's coming. I mean, based on-

Tucker [01:09:01] the behavior you're describing. It's quite possible. I wouldn't discount it. What do you make the two most famous in the US, the two most famous cabinet ministers in the Netanyahu government are Smotrash and Ben Gavir. Are they powerful figures in Israel? How are they regarded? What's their motive strategy plan?

Ari Flanzraich [01:09:29] I don't think that they're close to as popular as they were. I think Bibi's popularity has increased actually over the course of the war, because Israelis have a very short memory, especially when it comes to warfare. But I don't really know what to tell you about Smotrich and Benghvira, it's not really my

Tucker [01:09:47] I guess it just seems unimaginably radical from an American. If you think of Israel, the post-67 Israel that most Americans learned about, visited, all of a sudden you have these guys, these two Ashkenazi guys sound really, really radical. Or it seems like a departure from anything Americans have ever heard an Israeli government officials say.

Ari Flanzraich [01:10:16] I think what you're hearing is what you often hear behind closed doors all over Israel, what you can hear at a cafe in Tel Aviv. Meaning the notion of, yeah, maybe they could go somewhere, the Palestinians. Maybe they just like, they could be gone. The question of, those are questions that come up, you hear it regularly. These aren't like completely insane conversations to hear. You can hear it from like a hippie at a cafe in Tenevieve smoking a joint. What changed is that suddenly you were hearing it more and more on TV. I remember I heard one news commentator, news anchor ask about transfer. And I was like, this is a bit insane. Imagine if someone on CNN came on and started talking about transferring another, an entire other population who aren't illegal. Right, people who were born there have been there for thousands of years. Maybe hundreds, maybe thousands, I don't know. But it doesn't matter.

They were there when these rallies came. Yeah. Doesn't matter how long they've been there for. So yeah.

Tucker [01:11:21] What about, I mean, it used to be in my living memory, there was a significant population of Israelis who had totally different views. They're like, no, that's wrong. Human rights are a thing. You can't do that. How big is that? Berg I think is the kind of Israeli I remember from 25 years ago, there were a bunch of people like that. How many are left? I think the left is dead.

Ari Flanzraich [01:11:47] The left is dead, the Israeli left is dead. And the question as to why they died is because they spent, I think, a bit too much time beating the horse of Oslo dead. Oslo obviously failed. And the left was unwilling to concede that fact, which meant that for many, many years, I think unto this day, the left never re-evaluated. They never came with another proposal or another plan or another way of thinking about the conflict. They kept beating the horse of Oslo dead. Meanwhile, the Israeli right continues to churn out active propositions. We're going to reform the judiciary. We want to take the West Bank. Very concrete things that a right winger in Israel will tell you what they want. A left winger will tell how they feel. And, uh... I think that's, I think

Tucker [01:12:39] long and short of it. That's a good explanation. Do Israelis have a sense of what the rest of the world thinks of Israel?

Ari Flanzraich [01:12:49] Yeah, I think they have a sense. The question is how deeply do they think about the sense and how much merit are they willing to give? Do they care? I think deep down they care. No one likes to be hated. I don't think anyone likes to hated. But I think the more you feel like you're hated, the more want to hate everyone else or just completely discount them. The more you want to dig your heels in and double down.

Tucker [01:13:16] That's interesting. Yeah, I mean, I feel like I'm often attacked for hating Israel. I don't hate Israel at all. I feel sorry for Israel. I think they're in trouble. They don't seem to agree, but I think there are. But whatever my views. A lot of people hate Israel, like around the world. I hear it a lot when I travel. I feel like the moderate one. And I think that's a big change. And I always wonder, do the Israelis know that? Do they care?

Ari Flanzraich [01:13:43] I think the Israelis are probably the most hated people in the world right now. That's my impression. Full stop. One of the greatest things I ever did was not get an Israeli passport, and I feel bad for friends who have them. I would be scared. I'm going to be totally honest. I would have been scared right now. I'm sometimes scared to even say I'm Jewish. I'm lucky enough that I have Arabic, and if I'm in Europe, I just tell people I'm Palestinian, which some people might not like, but I think I put in the time to warrant it. Sometimes I'm scared to say that I'm a Jewish, and then I would definitely be scared to have an Israeli Passport.

Tucker [01:14:16] I think that's totally fair. That's fair. And I'm not, I'm the last person to whine about anti-Semitism, but I think Israelis literally hate it. So I agree with you completely. I just, I just all again, just once more, I want to be clear. You don't think Israelis have the sense that that's a bad thing and we should be worried about it or that we played any role in that at all.

Ari Flanzraich [01:14:39] I think the Israelis, there are Israelis who, you have a small liberal population of Israelis, many of whom I hear talking about the fact that they don't see a future for themselves in the country anymore. This is about two to three years in the making, even from the judicial reform. I had a lot of people telling me left-leaning, decent Israelis who were like, I don't know if I can have more kids here, or I don't want my kids to be in the army, or I didn't want my kid to have to deal with whatever the consequences of the judicial form and now this entire war. The rest of the Israeli population, I think by and large, are bent on, they've all doubled down.

Tucker [01:15:20] Really?

Ari Flanzraich [01:15:22] I think a lot of people.

Tucker [01:15:22] So Bibi reflects the population he represents.

Ari Flanzraich [01:15:27] I don't think a lot of people have problems with anything that Bibi represents. I think people have problem with the fact that he might have a corruption case, which I think is wrong.

Tucker [01:15:39] But you're never at dinner and people say, man, I can't believe all those kids who were killed in Gaza. That's bad. I'm sorry we did.

Ari Flanzraich [01:15:46] I don't hear it a lot, but what you can say, no, you might hear, it might be a symbolic gesture like a virtue signal, but it's immediately followed with, you know, that's what you got to do. I mean, they came to kill us or they're anti-semites.

Tucker [01:16:04] Where do Israelis think anti-Semitism comes from? I often hear it invoked, so and so's an anti-Semite, you're an anti Semite. How do they define it and what do they think its root is?

Ari Flanzraich [01:16:18] I think the root is age old as far as Israelis are concerned. People hate us because people have always hated Jews. You hear this all a lot in synagogues also across North America. You have a message being pushed constantly that people just hate us. And I think there are a lot of people who just hate Jews. And there's a lot of people are waiting for an excuse to hate Jews, but specifically when- Why do they hate Jews? But the question is, is there a distinction between those people and Palestinians? Are the Palestinians fundamentally anti-Semitic? You can spare me quotes from an imam here or an imaam there, or the fact that they conflate Jew and Israeli. By and large, is this a people who has premised its existence on killing Jews as Jews? And I do not think that that's the case.

Tucker [01:17:07] Yeah, I wouldn't know. I mean, I, I would know. But I just think there are a lot of anti-Semitic people and they hate Jews. I agree with that. And I think it's wrong. That's what I think. But I also think it worth that. Like, what is that? Is it a spiritual thing? I mean we say, well, it's always existed. I believe that. But what's its, I mean what's it's cause? And I've never heard one person ask that question. And I think I believe in asking. Or trying to understand the cause of everything. You can't often, but it's always worth doing. I wanted to know why Al-Qaeda attacked the US on 9-11. I thought it was horrible. I had a friend killed, but I still wanna know why. And I never hear anybody ask that question.

Ari Flanzraich [01:17:55] Given it, anyone ask about the sort of like the bottom root of antiseptic never.

Tucker [01:18:00] Not one time. Other than to say, and by the way, I'd be willing to believe that it's spiritual in nature. What does spiritual mean? That there's a belief among Jews and some Christians that Jews are distinct among peoples because God made them distinct and that there is a spiritual reaction. And that is a religious belief that some people have, many people have. And I'd be willing to believe, I don't know if it's true, that this is like a reaction against that from evil. So that's one explanation, but I never even hear anybody ask the question. Like, what I hear instead is people say, it's just, it's always been there, it always will be there. What does that mean? I guess that's what I'm asking.

Ari Flanzraich [01:18:54] But within the European context, and look, I'm not an expert on anti-Semitism. Within the European contacts, you have a people who are also forced into the margins of society. They're easily scapegoated. They also maintain a certain level of distinction from the rest of society, and those are people that are very easy to hate. But I can't give you an historiography of anti-semitism. I can tell you why I think it's on the rise right now. Why is it on the rise right now? We have a bit of an issue, right? I mean, you have Israel doing what Israel does. It's getting record amounts of attention. There's record amounts of sympathy with the Palestinian cause. I mean there are many people, if you ever asked them 20, 30, 40 years ago, if they understood what actually was the fate of the Palestinian people, they wouldn't have understood. They wouldn't've known. You know, there's a famous quote by Ben-Gurion who following 48, you know, there were 600, some 600 villages that were destroyed. And I remember there's somewhere in the archives there's a quote which says, you know, people are soon going to come visit this country and we don't want them to see, have superfluous thoughts. To use the word superfluos, meaning you got to clean up the mess, either like destroy them or plant trees, put parks in their place, which is why you have many parks all over Israel. And people didn't really understand.

Tucker [01:20:17] I didn't know that. How did I not know that? So parks you've seen us are often on the physical spot of a former Palestinian village.

Ari Flanzraich [01:20:27] In many cases, yes, in many cases yes, which is also bound up with the JNF, the Jewish National Fund. And so I remember hearing from someone in Toronto that I think the government was going to start sanctioning the J&F, and people were really up in arms about this. And I said, sort of, at the end of the day, you have to decide what your relationship with Israel is. You can't. It's hard to have. It's hard to expect people from without to understand why, at a synagogue, you also have an Israeli flag there if you don't also want to bear the brunt of what's happening in Israel, take some responsibility. And I'm saying, from without, you can't expect people to understand that. I think there's a sense within the Jewish American community specifically, but also in Israel. People expect everyone else to understand them from within. It's why it should be very obvious. Why Israelis believe it should be obvious what we're doing. All this should be obvious. The fact that you're asking questions is itself potentially an indication that you are against us, that you just want our demise. When I ask people questions in Israel, the first thing is like, why are you asking? If I want to interview someone as a journalist in Israel, I have to be very careful with the language I use. If I use the word with thanks to the Judean Samaria. Within a certain demographic you're at. Seriously, um, I tend to say we and not you because if I say you they're like, what do you mean you? They're all in this together No, I'm not an Israeli citizen. Even that is a bit sensitive You're describing narcissism

Tucker [01:22:05] the belief that other people should just understand what I'm feeling. And a healthy person understands that each one of us is sort of locked away in our own private traumas and that's why we communicate and I need to understand you. It's very important to understand to you and I want you to understand me, but it's not natural, right? That's the basis of a relationship.

Ari Flanzraich [01:22:24] It's an isolated and solipsistic society. Solipsistic is a better word. That's exactly right. In many ways. Yeah. There's something, in many cases, I find this thing a bit delusional about the mentality. It's just the fact that, for example, Arabic isn't spoken in the country. It used to be. I mean those were because they were

Tucker [01:22:45] Arab Jews who came from Arabic countries, but I think there were also Ashkenazi Jews who spoke Arabic. I think that was more common. I'm just, I think, that was my impression.

Ari Flanzraich [01:22:54] A whole lot. Maybe if they were there, for example, before the establishment of the state, but as of the establishment to the state you didn't have people really learning Arabic.

Tucker [01:23:02] The changes that have taken place or maybe it's just a change in my perception, but I just remember a country that was much more open to the world, but a lot has happened in that time. By the way, I should ask you, since you live there in Israel, how much damage has been done during this war? We get no sense of it at all, or I don't trust anything I see on the Internet. But do you get a sense it's a country at war, there's rubble on the street in of the evil.

Ari Flanzraich [01:23:32] In fact, I think the last round during June, for example, you know, I'm based in Jaffa at the moment. Yeah, yeah. There are massive strikes in a place called Bat Yam, just south of Jaffar, where you saw I think there was a three block radius of damage. Look, you do have damage relative to the stakes, minimal damage.

Tucker [01:23:50] Within his role right now. Does life seem normal-ish? Yeah, ish. Really? The Jews like the ish? Yes, that's true. I'm pro-ish myself. So it doesn't feel like a country under siege? Under siege?

Ari Flanzraich [01:24:09] Yeah, the war is being fought about 2000 kilometers away. Correct. Yeah, certainly not the seat.

Tucker [01:24:16] Is there a sense that there's a physical risk? Do people you know feel like, wow, we could get hammered by missiles, drones?

Ari Flanzraich [01:24:25] No, I don't think there's like an apocalyptic sense, but there is a sense, like damage can be done. These are ballistic missiles. People can die. But if you're smart, if you take the necessary steps, if go down to your shelter, you're probably going to be fine, like a 99% chance that you will be just fine.

Tucker [01:24:45] Do you talk to people who have a sense of how this would be resolved to people expected to end soon the war with Iran?

Ari Flanzraich [01:24:53] I don't think so. I think people want it to go on. I think the people want the job done. But what's a bit strange to me, what's ironic here, is that in America, it strikes me, the perception is more zero sum. In America, I think there's the sense that if we went through all this and the regime doesn't fall, then this was for naught. We wasted our time and we jeopardized our, for the GOP, we jeopardize our base or whatever else. You're a better expert at this than I am. Within Israel though, it's not a zero-sum game. If Israel, if this war ends because Trump decides it has to end because of internal pressure, economic pressure, and the regime hasn't fallen, Bibi is none the worse for it. It's not the ideal outcome, it is not the best possible outcome, but it's something he can work with. It's a good enough show. It's what you call in Hebrew an image of victory. It's the phrase that Netanyahu has been using since the beginning of the war, an image of victory.

Tucker [01:25:54] Part of our problem in the US may be that we take our own rhetoric more seriously or perhaps too seriously. And so in order to justify this and the previous exchange in June, we had to endure like weeks of hearing that we were all about to be killed by Iran, by this regime, which some people didn't believe, including me, but some people did believe and we have a whole channel devoted to telling Americans their single biggest risk. So if that regime is still there, it's kind of hard to walk down from that, if you see what I mean.

Ari Flanzraich [01:26:29] I think in America there's the big problem is that Americans are fundamentally divorced from history. They forget that they're actually inside of history.

Tucker [01:26:37] That's for sure. I think that's a, for a non-American, that's a perceptive observation. And the Jews think that history is over.

Ari Flanzraich [01:26:46] Yeah, I think Israel believes that sort of, you know, we got back to the land, we have our state, and it's kind of done now. History's over. I think that's the distinction between Israel and America. America forgets that they're at the center of history, and the Israelis believe that they're enjoying the aftermath of history as if there can't be another exile, as if there cannot be another catastrophe. And that's short-sightedness.

Tucker [01:27:11] Where does, um, among... Is there any discussion of, like, restoring the third temple? That would seem obvious, at least from my reading of- No. The Torah. No, that's not even a thing. No. But I per-

Ari Flanzraich [01:27:27] Personally think, if you're going to ask me, I personally think it would be great to build a third temple just on like another hill. I don't think you can do it on another hill. I bet you could get a rabbinical precedent. You could definitely pay some guy off to let you. You're gonna have a third temple.

Tucker [01:27:40] If you're gonna have a third temple, I'm strongly in favor of putting on another hill just because then you avoid global religious war.

Ari Flanzraich [01:27:47] Yeah, but it would also be a shame to come back to the homeland after 3,000 years and leave potentially without having built something, you know, sweet. But is

Tucker [01:27:56] Is there any effort to do that that you know of?

Ari Flanzraich [01:28:01] No, but there are a lot of people recently, it's funny, there's, you know, the Messiah patches that a lot Israeli soldiers have. I do, yes. There's now on the back of cars, there are these stickers now that are sort of like the image, it looks like a Greek or like a Roman temple, but it's a temple image. Oh, I've seen it. Oh, you've seen the sticker? Yes, I have. So that's blown up as of the last year or two, do I think it will actually happen?

Tucker [01:28:23] But before the last year or two, or let's just say before October 7th, there was none of that that you saw.

Ari Flanzraich [01:28:31] Trying to like secret in like red heifers every now and again, they're a serious minority in the country. And as Avra mentioned, you had people, there were attempts several times to- Five, he said. Five. I didn't know that. Yeah, I knew about one, I didn't know about five. But again, I think this is not, there's no state level or institutional policy that's working towards the construction of a third temple. I mean, look at the buildings in Tel Aviv. I don't think the Israelis right now are in a position to build a big, beautiful temple. The best buildings in Tel Aviv were built by Arabs in the Ottoman era. I knew that.

Tucker [01:29:04] I knew that. There's been a, I think Israel is an amazing society in some ways. They built a lot considering how young it is. Architecture has not been on the top of the achievement list, I would say. That's why you put the city beside the sea. Yeah. No, but it's still not. It's, yeah. So I share your view of the local architecture. It's fascinating. So how has the country, just big picture, how has it changed? So in the seven and a half years you were there before, two and a 1.5 cents. October 7th, like what changes have you noticed in people's attitudes?

Ari Flanzraich [01:29:47] You know, there was, at the height of the war, I went to buy a new laptop from a kid. He was like 18, 19 years old, and to find out that he's a soldier, he works for the Navy. And so he's like a young thing, he looks very, very young. I went and we started talking, and I explained that I'm a journalist, that I do some work. And he said, listen, after October the 7th, we can't trust the Arabs. I said really like I have a question, like, where do you travel within Israel? And he goes, you know, back in the day, my father would go to a place called Kalkili, which is on the other side of the Green Line. And he says, but we, with the family, would go a place Kfar Qasim, which is the Israeli side of Green Line, we're like right snug on the line. And he said, but ever since the war, I stopped going to Kfar Kasim. And I was like, do you go to another place called Tira, which is even closer to Tel Aviv? And he's like, no, I won't risk it. I don't even like going to Jaffa. And I told him, I said like, What's going to be left to you if you keep operating this way? Like you're king of the hill as it were, you're the landlord, but you're scared. It's like owning a house and being scared to walk into four out of the five rooms in the house. It's not a way to live, it's not the way to be a homeowner, right? You have this thing, Ben-Yvier's big platform when he was running for elections was, we're going to be the landlords now. In Hebrew, ba'alei abait, the landlords. How loud he said that? Yeah, that was a platform. There were signs in the West Bank about that. We're the landlords now. Yeah, we're going to be the landlords. And the problem in Israel is that, especially in the west bank, is that there's a lot of folks on lording over the land.

Tucker [01:31:30] And not really dwelling. Ben Gavir's election slogan was we're going to be the landlords. We're dealing with lack of self awareness now.

Ari Flanzraich [01:31:38] Like that out loud. Quite the opposite. He was very, very aware. It was very strategic and very tactical. Especially within the settlement population, of course. You're in a place where you don't feel like you're really the Lord. You really don't, except for the gun, you don't really feel like I'm the king of the hill. There's a guy who's saying, I'm going to make you king. I'm going to put the crown on your head. It's tempting, especially to like naive, young, potentially troubled youth who are running around the hilltops.

Tucker [01:32:05] Interesting. How long can Israel go with all this territory that's not part of their country, but that they control? Like what? With Gaza and the West Bank, and now Southern Lebanon and parts of Syria, like, does that just go on forever? Do people envision a time where the official borders of Israel expand and like, this is our country?

Ari Flanzraich [01:32:30] Look, if Israel can't manage Gaza, I don't think they can manage South Lebanon. I don't think that what's happening in South Lebanon is going to be permanent. There might be a post or two on the border. You could potentially expect that. Are they going to take a large swath of Lebanese territory? No, but what they will do is render them uninhabitable, which is a kind of way of doing all this but not that. How do you do that? It's the art of indecision, which Bibi's art. You don't occupy it, but you leave it unoccupiable. Unoccupiable because it's just, there's nothing there. Well, that's what the Lebanese border is right now. In many cases, not across the border, but there are many spots on the border in which everything is completely razed. Those were also houses used in many cases by Hezbollah. So like, I kind of get that. In Syria as well, like I don't think that's a permanent decision. I think it's leverage that could potentially be used against Jolani to come to some sort of agreement, which I think will eventually come. Not a peace deal, but something, an understanding.

Tucker [01:33:27] Jelani being the new head of Syria, who a lot of people assumed was installed there with the agreement of Israel, I assume that. I still think it, but now they're against him? What is the truth there? Who said they're again him? I don't know. I've heard recently that the Israelis are troubled with Johnny. I don I don t know if that's true or not.

Ari Flanzraich [01:33:49] I don't know if they're, I mean, he's moved troops toward the Lebanese border, and there are rumors that he would be willing to fight Hezbollah. There's a common enemy. I think the Israelis fear Jolani long-term, and they also used to have a very good understanding with Assad. The problem is that Assad was also in bed with Iran and Hezballah, so there's a bit of a problem. I don't think the Israeli's ever had a problem with Assad, and I think, as far as I know, before the civil war, there were also secret talks going on. The Israelis were also preparing to make some kind of agreement with Assad. In the short term, I think Jolani and the Israelis can work together relatively well because it'll take Jolany a very long time until he will be able to build or, as it were, cement the ground beneath him. Yes. He can't start problems with Israel right now. But in 20, 30 years, he might be able.

Tucker [01:34:41] What's the typical Israeli view of the United States? I think I've got.

Ari Flanzraich [01:34:47] It right. Like stupid Americans. They sometimes want to live like you. You know, I think they want to speak English. They want a certain kind of American lifestyle. But they don't want to be, they think you're naive.

Tucker [01:35:06] Is there affection or mostly contempt?

Ari Flanzraich [01:35:11] From what I hear, a lot of affection. I mean, definitely over the last year or two, I think this has a lot to do with Bibi. There has been a kind of redic of like, who's the United States to tell us what to do? They shouldn't be telling us what to do, and Israelis get frustrated when there's talk of that, like Bibi's going to bend to Trump, or that America says, or like Biden says, you can't do this. This is the red line. I think there's a deep frustration inside of Israel because they want to have their cake and eat it.

Tucker [01:35:42] They want the money, but also

Ari Flanzraich [01:35:43] They want support, but also I think they want American knowledge that we're in a way doing your bidding. I think a lot of Israelis believe that we are doing your bidding, we're doing something good for you.

Tucker [01:35:52] Doing the hard work that you want to. Yeah. They feel that way. I can speak for the whole country. But I mean, you hear that. I hear that, yeah. What about Trump? What's the view of Trump?

Ari Flanzraich [01:36:06] Yeah, a lot of Israelis love Trump. Again, I'm speaking from my experience.

Tucker [01:36:10] What do they like about him?

Ari Flanzraich [01:36:12] They like that he's willing to take the gloves off for once. I think they saw Biden as a pussy. Yeah. As a feckless pussy who wasn't willing to make a decision, wasn't able to do it. For example, Bibi is willing to do, even though Bibi was also a pussy for a very long time. And so yeah, I think it's refreshing to them. And I think, they don't see. Look, as Avram also said, Israelis don't have a very good understanding of what happens on the American interior, of American culture, most Israelis do not speak English. I think this is like a delusion people have because they go to Tel Aviv and people speak English outside of Tel Avive, there's not a whole lot of English being spoken. And so there is a sense in which all they see Trump as is what he has done for us for the fact that he would be more willing to help us. And that's what matters if you're an Israeli, you care about Israel.

Tucker [01:37:04] Just like you are an American and care about America. That's right. That's always been my favorite thing about Israel is they're nationalists. What's the view of the Gulf States? You have to be more specific. What do they think of Dubai and Abu Dhabi UAE? They love the UAE.

Ari Flanzraich [01:37:22] They love the UAE. The UAE also loves them, but I don't think the government is a big fan of Israel. I've heard from people, for example, that like, Emirati diplomats are a bit shocked when they come to Israel, and they're also, in some cases, mistreated at the airports. I think they find Israeli society a bit shocking in its rudeness at times. I think, they're not given the kind of respect that they're accustomed to having within Gulf countries that have pretty, you know. Standard royal hierarchies.

Tucker [01:37:53] Different manners. Those are elaborately polite societies with all kinds of Rituals run manners. Yeah. No, I think they are shocked

Ari Flanzraich [01:38:03] Yeah, so Israelis love the UAE and there are very, very close relations between the UA in Israel. What do they think of the Saudis? I couldn't really tell you, I think a lot of Israelis... I mean, they house Hamas as far as a lot of Israelis are concerned. I don't hear people saying that Qatar as a country is our enemy. I don't think Israelis think a whole lot about Qatar. Yeah, I believe that. I just don't think they think about them a lot.

Tucker [01:38:35] What do they think, Sue, Israel has a lot of high profile defenders in the United States? Are they well known in Israel? Well, I don't know, Ben Shapiro or... No, no, no. Unknown. Mark Levin. No one's ever heard of them. I'm sure there's many.

Ari Flanzraich [01:38:53] Have heard of them. Do you have like the average Israeli listening to Mark Levin or Ben Shapiro? Absolutely not. Because also Ben Shapira was speaking in the name of, if anything, American Jewry. His conversation is maybe about Israel, but it's between Western Jews or English speaking Jews. It doesn't really impinge upon the Israelis.

Tucker [01:39:14] To Israelis, what's their view of American Jews specifically? I don't know if I-

Ari Flanzraich [01:39:21] give you that in a sentence or two, I don't, there's all kinds of different relationships. I'm avoiding falling into certain kinds of banalities or stereotypes.

Tucker [01:39:30] Totally I just of course. Well, you can't generalize actually about most cats, but I'd say if there's like an overwhelming

Ari Flanzraich [01:39:36] And they're also mixed feelings. They're mixed feelings, I have issues with American Jews, but they're also my people. And this is, I think, the overarching sentiment of the end of the day, there are many disagreements between the two peoples, but there are also a single people. It's just like you have disagreements with your family, I'm sure, but they're still your family. And that's by and large, if I had to sum it up, that's the dynamic. But there's certainly a generational break right now. I think the younger generation of liberal Jews, I think they're beginning to see, and this isn't the majority of Jews right now. The majority of younger generation Jews I think are still following in the footsteps of their parents, but there is a significant population of young Jews who I think, are looking at Israel and saying, we don't like what you're doing and it doesn't necessarily not about your family.

Tucker [01:40:28] What changed that? VOD3.

Ari Flanzraich [01:40:32] And the fact that it's also unpopular, if you're a liberal Jew in a liberal circle, you don't want to be the guy who's liberal on every single point but stops at Gaza. It's socially awkward. In many cases, it's a social decision, I don't think it's major theoretical.

Tucker [01:40:49] Right, this is not a question of principle, it's just like it's becoming unacceptable to be pro- It could be both, but also, you know

Ari Flanzraich [01:40:55] Principles in America are a big part of sociality or social life.

Tucker [01:40:58] They certainly are.

Ari Flanzraich [01:41:01] It's true for any society, I think, especially America. You think so? I think people like touting their morals quite a bit in America. Really? Yeah. I've never sat with an Arab and he tells me like, you know, I believe in this and I believe that. And I think this is really wrong. I don't hear that. On the subway in Toronto, you can hear people talking through each other about their various moral beliefs that they've never had to ask upon in their lives.

Tucker [01:41:29] That is, that is a very wise observation. I've never sat with an Arab and he's like, I think this is wrong. Yeah, it's a bit like I'm sure the Arabs have moral opinions. Of course they do. Of course I do. It's not just they don't have standards, but they're not throwing them at you at dinner.

Ari Flanzraich [01:41:44] They don't, but they're just not the foundations of their identity.

Tucker [01:41:50] Well, there is a certain self-righteousness in the West. That's not necessarily the same as righteousness. I mean, it's just- Yeah, definitely. There's a posturing that goes on. Here's my last question. How do you think, and it's impossible to know, but like in five years, what does the landscape look like is in the Middle East? Is the United States still as closely lad with Israel as it is today? Is Lebanon- territorially intact. Is Israel safer? Have we gotten a seven front war down to two fronts, say, or no fronts? Is Bibi still in power? What current trends continue? What does it look like?

Ari Flanzraich [01:42:27] Very well could be empowered in five years, I think he'll probably get elected in October. Yeah, I'll think it's highly likely that he'll get re-elected. And I think everything that's happening right now is in some way or another engineered for that to happen. Again, as we said, the personal ambitions of Bibi happen to align with some of the strategic ambitions of the state. And if you can just modulate that, then it's a perfect recipe to win elections. In terms of Lebanon, do I think the Israelis will be highly active deep inside Lebanon? No. And I think a lot of these, Bibi doesn't want a ton of war. I think after Bibi gets into, if he gets re-elected, I think you'll see Lebanon sort of come to a close. Even Iran could come to close. He'll want to just sort of like bring in a new status quo that will be useful to him. And when he has to turn up the heat, he'll turn up to heat.

Tucker [01:43:26] Do you think, again, purely speculative, but if Donald Trump went to BB tomorrow and said, we're shutting this down with Iran, it's terrible for markets, it's terribly for me, my political party, could he make BB stop?

Ari Flanzraich [01:43:45] I think he probably could, but Bibi would probably want to find a kind of middle ground, meaning they had a ceasefire in Lebanon, but there were still Israeli strikes in Lebanon on an almost daily basis. Right? Yeah. I think you could call that the Israeli ceasefire. Yeah. In Hebrew called the war between the wars.

Tucker [01:44:05] It's so funny when, you know, growing up here, we were taught that Israel had wars in 48, 56, 67, 73, 82, and then the Intifadas. That's the official history of it, right? And then you get older and you realize, nah, it was kind of a war continuously.

Ari Flanzraich [01:44:24] Call it a war, but there is fighting, there's fighting or there are strikes, like there's activity. I don't know if I'd call it war. But I do think you could potentially see a situation and it depends on the conditions of the end of the war. If there's an agreement, what the stakes are and the stakeholders, but they could be a situation, I can envisage a situation in which Israel, for example, is still striking not necessarily on a daily basis, but that they operate in the skies of Tehran, that they strike. Needed and there's still a lot to be seen I mean I don't I think there should be there's probably gonna be some attempt to activate people to try to get protested up again I wouldn't be entirely surprised you know Ron yeah I find it hard to believe that the Israelis put all this together without the hope or without some expectation that when things quiet down things internally. Will begin to sort of move again. I don't know if you can expect people to go out and protest while there are strikes. The strikes should, I think they would expect, lay the groundwork for something to happen.

Tucker [01:45:38] Do you have any idea how the Israeli government winds up with so many agents of influence and just agents in all these hostile countries? How many there's so many people in Iran working for Israel, same in Syria, same in Lebanon, like how do they do that?

Ari Flanzraich [01:45:54] People are easy to buy. People are easy to buy. Apparently they are. I mean, I like to say that the best spies in the Arab world all work for the Mossad. That's why they don't have good intelligence agencies.

Tucker [01:46:09] How do they do that? I mean, it's just remarkable. I don't think the.

Ari Flanzraich [01:46:13] Pulls that off. They could if they wanted to. I think the CIA is probably just lazy. The stakes aren't as high in many cases. You find someone's weakness.

Tucker [01:46:25] We're homosexual. We only do that in the Senate here. We haven't bothered to do it in Iran, I guess. That day might come, you never know. All right, thank you very much. That was interesting as hell. 6:[["$