«Болгарский гамбит»: Риттер предлагает Румена Радева в переговорщики ЕС по Украине и безопасности Европы
Источник: https://scottritter.substack.com/p/the-bulgarian-gambit
Краткое содержание
Риттер рассказывает о поездке в Софию (12–14 ноября) на презентацию болгарского издания его книги «Highway to Hell» (издательство Scorpio Press, главред Илиев Светослав), где он написал предисловие. Затем его ждала Москва: конференция омбудсмена Яны Лантратовой около 15 ноября и лекции в Анкаре и Стамбуле. На этом фоне он выстраивает политический тезис: премьер-министр Болгарии Румен Радев — единственный лидер ЕС, способный стать мостом между Европой и Россией, и именно его следует сделать европейским переговорщиком по Украине и новой архитектуре безопасности.
Контекст: Абу-Даби и Дублин
Визит совпал с трёхсторонней встречей США, России и Украины в Абу-Даби (11–12 ноября), где американская команда назвала новую европейскую систему безопасности условием прочного мира. По Риттеру, США и Россия сошлись в общих чертах, опираясь на российский проект договора от 17 декабря 2021 года; Зеленский назвал это «российской ловушкой», а европейцы возмутились форматом без их участия. В тот же день, 12 ноября, в Дублине собралось Европейское политическое сообщество. Вопрос, по автору, не в том, будет ли Европа участвовать, а в том, в какой форме и кто её представит.
Макрон предложил непривязывающую «Декларацию об основных принципах европейской безопасности»: участие Европы во всех решениях о её безопасности; включение Украины в переговоры и подтверждение её суверенитета и территориальной целостности; реальные гарантии безопасности Киеву; учёт угроз за пределами украинского конфликта (Балтика, Чёрное море, гибридные и кибератаки). Лидеры спорили о представителе: отвергли высокого представителя ЕС Каю Каллас в пользу расширенной группы «E5» (Великобритания, Франция, Германия, Италия, Польша). Риттер считает, что именно антироссийская ментальность такого формата привела к отказу Москвы допускать Европу в Абу-Даби и к насмешкам над этой идеей. Он утверждает, что Европа — главное препятствие на пути урегулирования, не ведущего к полному разрушению Украины («чтобы спасти деревню, нужно было её уничтожить»), и что без США Европа не сможет «держать Украину на аппарате»: демократическое большинство в Конгрессе не имеет голосов для преодоления вето Трампа.
Болгарская позиция и политика
Из 40 участников Дублина 39 подписали французский документ; не подписала Болгария. Радев поддержал четыре принципа, но возразил против преамбулы с формулой «неспровоцированная полномасштабная российская агрессия» и отметил, что из ранних версий убрали поддержку абу-дабийских переговоров. Он не вошёл и в «коалицию желающих», выступая за дипломатический компромисс.
Риттер объясняет болгарский контекст: 70–80% жителей положительно относятся к России, которую считают освободительницей после русско-турецкой войны 1877–78 годов; 3 марта (день Сан-Стефанского договора) — День освобождения; памятники Александру II и генералам. Вступление в ЕС и еврозону (цены местами выросли более чем вдвое) и война на Украине вызвали ответную реакцию и крах доминирования проевропейских сил (ГЕРБ). Радев, президент с 2016 года, ушёл с поста в 2026 году, создал партию «Прогрессивная Болгария», преодолел попытки оппонентов втянуть ЕС в «контрроссийскую» информкампанию (по образцу румынских выборов 2024 года) и получил 43,9% голосов и абсолютное большинство мест. Критики называют его «новым Орбаном» для ЕС; Риттер, напротив, видит в нём единственного с видением, способным сблизить стороны. Цитата Радева: «Нам нужна Европа за столом... Только учёт интересов и опасений обеих стран гарантирует прочный мир».
Риттер возражает Мерцу, сказавшему в Дублине, что важна готовность Путина вести переговоры, а не личность представителя: Россия, по его словам, готова, но только с партнёрами, реалистично учитывающими её «законные интересы».
Встречи в Софии
На первом ужине Риттер встретился с редактором, послом Стояном Денчевым (председатель попечительского совета UniBIT, бывший посол в Финляндии, главный секретарь Совмина, влиятельный «теневой» советник Радева) и генерал-майором запаса Груди Ангеловым (контингент Болгарии в Ираке 2003 года; в декабре 2003 погибли пятеро его солдат, ранены 23). Все согласились, что Каллас и фон дер Ляйен не подходят для роли представителей, а выбранная пятёрка — второстепенные чиновники без полномочий. 13 ноября Денчев опубликовал на Epicenter.bg статью с четырьмя аргументами за Радева: сбалансированный подход, сопротивление российской идее архитектуры по границам до 1997 года, интерес чёрноморской державы и приверженность дипломатии. Риттер поддержал это на двух публичных выступлениях и в болгарских СМИ, а теперь продвигает идею за пределами Болгарии, призывая других аналитиков.
Значимость
Эссе — открытая лоббистская кампания: подаётся как «последний шанс» Европы и Украины, альтернатива — «война до конца и исчезновение Украины». Читать нужно с поправкой: Риттер выступает как заинтересованное лицо (гость, получающий пожертвования на поездки), опирается на российскую версию истоков войны (2021 год) и принимает за факт тезис, что вторжение стало следствием отказа от российских предложений. Содержательно важны два сюжета: единственный отказ Болгарии подписать декларацию и спор о том, кто представляет Европу.
🧾 Транскрипт (формат)
The Bulgarian Gambit
Источник: https://scottritter.substack.com/p/the-bulgarian-gambit
Statue to Tsar Alexander II in downtown Sofia, Bulgaria This past summer I was informed by Clarity Press, which published by book Highway to Hell and as such handles the foreign publishing rights, that my book had been acquired by Scorpio Press, a Bulgarian publishing house. Iliev Svetoslav, the editor in chief for Scorpio, requested that I write a foreword for the Bulgarian edition, and asked if I might be willing to travel to Bulgaria for the launch of the book, sometime in November. I responded in the affirmative for both, and set about modifying my November travel plans to incorporate a 2-day visit to Sofia, the capital of Bulgaria. I was scheduled to be in Moscow on or about November 15 to participate in a conference organized by Yana Lantratova, the Russian Ombudsman for Human Rights, after which I would fly to Turkey where I was scheduled to give two lectures, one each in Ankara and Istanbul. The Thanksgiving holiday served as a hard travel “stop”, which meant any Bulgaria visit would have to take place up front. As such, I planned to arrive in Sofia on November 12, and depart November 14.
My visit coincided serendipitously with the convening of the European Political Community, in Dublin, Ireland, on November 12, which itself followed on the heels of a tri-lateral meeting in Abu Dhabi on November 11-12 between the United States, Russia, and Ukraine where the issue of a new European security framework was raised by the US negotiation team as a necessary condition for any chance of a lasting peace between Russia and Ukraine. While the US and Russia appear to have found common ground on the broad framing of this objective, grounded as it appears to be in a Russian draft treaty presented to both the US and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) back on December 17, 2021, both Ukraine and Europe have taken umbrage, with Ukrainian President Zelensky claiming that the US was walking into a Russian trap, and the Europeans concerned that a decision which would redefine Europe’s security was being discussed in a format which lacked any European participation.
The question confronting both Europe and the other parties involved (the US, Russia and Ukraine) is not if Europe will be involved in any broader discussion about a future European security framework agreement, but rather what form this involvement would take and, perhaps most importantly, who would represent Europe at the table. The European collective, represented by a cabal of elected representatives from the European “big three” (UK, France and Germany) and the unelected leaders of the European Union (EU) and NATO have long rejected out of hand Russian efforts to craft a new security architecture which redefines the role played by NATO and takes into account Russian security concerns; the December 2021 Russian draft treaty was dismissed out of hand as an example of Russia trying to possess a veto over NATO membership and force structure. The US, too, gave short shrift to the Russian proposals. The end result of this rejection was the Special Military Operation initiated by Russia in February 2022. Today, in the fifth year of this conflict, Ukraine is losing badly and the US and Europe are divided on how best to proceed, with the US seeking a diplomatic off-ramp from the fighting, and Europe wanting to continue underwriting the costs of a war they seem will to fight “to the last Ukrainian.”
But the reality is that Europe cannot continue to keep Ukraine on life support without the assistance of the United States. While Europe is hopeful that a new Democratic majority in the US Congress might be willing to keep the life line open by budgeting money for the Ukrainian cause, the fact of the matter is that President Trump retains the ability to veto any legislation he disagrees with, and the Democrats lack the votes to automatically override such a veto. If Trump can put forward a viable option for ending the Ukraine conflict, it will be almost impossible for the US Congress to keep pushing for war. This is where European concurrence of a new European security architecture comes in. In Dublin, French President Emmanuel Macron initiated a “Declaration on Key Principles of European Security, a political, non-binding proposal which outlined European priorities for ending the conflict in Ukraine and shaping a European security architecture within the framework of the ongoing US-Russian dialogue. The French proposal was built on four core principles, namely (1) that there must be European involvement in any decision affecting European security, (2) that any peace talks must include Ukraine and reaffirm Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, (3) that Ukraine must be provided with credible and effective security guarantees to prevent renewed aggression, and (4) any agreement of European security must consider threats beyond the Ukrainian conflict, including both the Baltic and Black Sea regions and the threat of hybrid war, cyber attacks, and information manipulation.
Macron argued that Europe must not only define their own security priorities, but also take the initiative when it comes to discussing European security with the Russians. The European leaders spent a considerable amount of time and effort debating who best to represent Europe, rejecting the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security, Kaja Kallas, in favor of an expanded “E5” group (the UK, France and Germany, together with Italy and Poland.) The problem with this formulation is that it represents the very anti-Russian mentality which led Russia to not only reject European participation in the Abu Dhabi talks, but openly mock the very concept of European participation.
As things currently stand, Europe represents the greatest single obstacle to finding a path out of the current Russian-Ukrainian conflict in a manner which doesn’t involve Russia totally destroying Ukraine as a viable modern nation state. In short, the European posture today is reminiscent of the Vietnam War saying, “We had to destroy the village in order to save the village.”
In order to “save” Ukraine, Europe will ending up being responsible for Ukraine’s destruction.
Of the 40 EU members participating in the Dublin gathering, 39 signed on to the French proposal. There was, however, a single hold out—Bulgaria. Bulgaria’s Prime Minister Rumen Radev supported the four core principles contained in Macron’s document, but expressed reservations over the wording contained in the preamble, which seemed grounded in the concept of what Macron described as “unprovoked full-scale Russian aggression against Ukraine.” Radev noted that earlier drafts of the French document had supported the US-mediated talks in Abu Dhabi, but had been dropped in favor of the more anti-Russian posturing. The Bulgarian Prime Minister believed that the EU’s position should reflect the present-day realities that are on the table in Abu Dhabi, as this was the only way to achieve a just and lasting peace through negotiations. Radev’s position on the French proposal was consistent with his earlier decisions not to participate in the so-called “coalition of the willing” focused on continued financial and military aid to Ukraine, favoring diplomatic compromise over military escalation.
In Bulgaria, I was struck by the fact that the vast majority of the Bulgarian people—between 70-80 percent—had a positive image of Russia. In Bulgarian national memory, Russia is regarded as the liberator of the Bulgarian people, an outcome which occurred as the result of the Russian victory over the Ottoman Empire in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78. Statues have been erected honoring Russian Tsar Alexander II and key Russian generals, and March 3—the day that the Treaty of San Stefano was signed in 1878, ending the war and preserving Bulgaria as an intact Orthodox entity—is recognized today as Bulgaria’s National Liberation Day.
The narcotic of economic prosperity attached to the notion of EU membership politically empowered progressive liberal elites, perhaps best represented by the Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria (GERB), who pushed for membership in both NATO and the EU. But the war in Ukraine, with its Russophobic undertones, combined with the dysfunction of the EU and the economic harm done to Bulgaria by entering the EU zone (prices jumped by more than 100% in many cases) has created a political backlash that led to the demise of the pro-EU dominance of the Bulgarian parliament. Radev, who won the Presidency in 2016, was in a constant state of conflict with GERB and its political allies during his two terms in office, resigned from the presidency in 2026 and formed his own political party, Progressive Bulgaria, so he could make a bid at becoming Prime Minister (in the Bulgarian system, the Prime Minister holds more political power that the President, who functions in a more ceremonial role as Head of State). Radev overcame an effort by his political opponents to get the EU to engage in a “counter Russian” information campaign, similar to that the EU successfully waged in the 2024 Romanian presidential election, and his party won a landslide victory, garnering some 43.9% of the vote and winning an absolute majority of seats in the parliament, cementing his position as Prime Minister.
Radev has been described as being a pragmatic, somewhat pro-Russian leader with Eurosceptic leanings, and many European Russophobes have accused the Bulgarian leader as assuming the role formerly held by former Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban as the EU’s “chief disruptor.” But any rational assessment of Radev’s posture vis-a-vis Europe and Russia finds that the Bulgarian leader is, out of all the leaders of the EU and its constituent states today, the only one possessing a vision which could successfullt bridge the gap between Europe and Russia in a meaningful way. “We need Europe at the negotiating table,” Radev proclaimed in Dublin. “How can we tale about a new European security architecture without Europe at the table? I do not think the United States and Russia alone can resolve the problems we will face in the future. We must defend Ukraine’s interests and ensure Russia feels confident about its own interests. Only by taking into account the interests and concerns of both countries can we be sure of a lasting peace.”
Fredrich Merz, the Chancellor of Germany, noted in Dublin that “At this stage, what matters is not the individual involved, but whether Putin is prepared to negotiate.”
Merz couldn’t be more wrong. Russia is prepared to negotiate—its presence at Abu Dhabi underscores this fact. But it will only negotiate with partners who are willing and able to realistically take into account Russia’s legitimate interests, defined by present realities, when crafting a framework for peace.
Rumen Radev, alone of all the other leaders of the EU, is such a man.
On my first day in Bulgaria, I had the honor of joining my editor, Iliev Svetoslav, for a dinner with Ambassador Stoyan Denchev, the President of the Board of Trustees of the University of Library Studies and Information Technologies (UniBIT), and Major General Grudi Angelov, the former Commandant of the Rakovski National Defense College and Deputy National Representative of the first Bulgarian military contingent deployed to Iraq in 2003 who retired from active service in 2022. General Angelov is held in extremely high regard in Bulgaria, and during his deployment to Iraq his men cooperated with US Marines in the vicinity of Karbala and Najaf; in this role, five of Angelov’s soldiers were killed, and another 23 wounded, in December 2003. Denchev, whose distinguished career includes service as Bulgaria’s Ambassador to Finland, service as Chief Secretary of Bulgaria’s Council of Ministers, and a member of parliament, where he served as the Deputy Chairman of the Foreign Policy Commission, is widely considered as one of the most influential “shadow” advisors to the Radev government. During our conversation, we discussed the situation in Ukraine, and the issue of Russia’s insistence that any peace deal incorporate a new European security agreement which takes into account Russian interests. We all agreed that the current slate of European leadership, led by Kaja Kallas and Ursula van der Leyen, were ill suited for the task of representing Europe in any negotiations with the Russians, as were any of the major European leaders present in Dublin, Ireland. Making matters worse, the five persons selected to represent Europe were minor national security officials lacking any decision making authority.
I asked what role Bulgaria could play in helping bridge the gap between Europe and Russia, and Ambassador Denchev replied by informing me that he was publishing an article the next day in which he would argue that Prime Minister Radev should serve as the leading European Union representative in any negotiations to end the war in Europe and shape Europe’s future security architecture. True to his word, on November 13 the Bulgarian outlet Epicenter.bg published Denchev’s article. In it, Denchev outlined four primary reasons Radev should serve in this role. First, Radev is the only European leader who has embraced a balanced approach toward resolving the conflict with Ukraine, as witnessed by his comments in Dublin, Ireland. Second, Radev has pushed back against Russian efforts to redefine European security architecture based upon pre-1997 borders. Third, as the leader of a Black Sea nation, Radev has a vested interest in resolving the issues underpinning Black Sea security and economic viability. and Fourth, Radev has consistently opted for diplomacy over military escalation.
With Denchev’s permission, I echoed his proposal in each of my two public speaking engagements in Sofia—both well attended in terms of numbers and senior Bulgarian officials and military officers—as well as my appearance on Bulgarian media.
But adding my voice to Ambassador Denchev’s inside Bulgaria is simply adding volume to an echo chamber; Denchev certainly does not nee my help is making arguments to the Bulgarian people. Where my voice can assist in this effort is to make the case for Radev’s appointment as the EU negotiator for Ukraine and European Security outside of Bulgaria. This article represents the first effort in this regard, and I am hopeful that other geopolitical analysts will pick up the baton and join this race.
Getting Prime Minister Radev across the finish line may be Europe and Ukraine’s last chance at a lasting peace with Russia.
The alternative is not attractive—a war to the finish which sees the extinction of Ukraine and the diminishment of Europe and its institutions, including the EU and NATO, to a degree that Europe will become a dysfunctional continent whose component states will devolve into the kind of continental conflicts both the EU and NATO were created to prevent.
The Bulgarian Gambit is perhaps Europe’s last great chance for peace and prosperity.
I urge everyone to get onboard.
(Note: I am currently in Russia, where I will be engaged in numerous events that will allow me to promote the Bulgarian Gambit and other opportunities for constructive dialogue between the US, Europe and Russia. This can only be done with the support of followers and subscribers who provide the donations that underwrite my work. These projects are ongoing, and in constant need of financial support. I thank everyone who has made my trip to Bulgaria and Russia possible with their donations, as well as those who will continue to support m work going forward. Your donations are an investment in peace, and I promise to put them to good use.)
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