Знакомство с Жаком Бо: швейцарский разведчик, миротворец и эксперт по Украине в беседе с Риттером
Источник: https://scottritter.substack.com/p/introducing-jacques-baud
Краткое содержание
Интервью Скотта Риттера, записанное в Брюсселе (Бельгия) с бывшим швейцарским офицером стратегической разведки, полковником Генштаба Жаком Бо (Jacques Baud). Это биографическая беседа: Риттер представляет американской аудитории человека, чьи тексты об Украине широко цитируются, и подчёркивает широту его опыта — от анализа сил Варшавского договора до создания разведывательной структуры в миссии ООН в Судане.
Вступление Риттера — рассуждение о свободе слова: по его словам, в США она закреплена Первой поправкой как неотчуждаемое право, не требующее разрешения государства, и это не «американская», а общечеловеческая ценность, с которой у Европы сегодня «плохо». Это и служит поводом для беседы с Бо. Прямо в тексте беседы о санкциях против Бо речь не идёт; тема свободы слова оставлена во вступлении.
Путь в разведку и подготовка
Бо родился и вырос в Женеве, окончил Женевский университет по эконометрике. В Швейцарии тогда не было профессиональной армии, только милиция: гражданин жил гражданской жизнью и служил в армии. Он стал офицером (производство «ровно 50 лет назад»), параллельно писал военные статьи для журналов Британии и Италии. Однажды вечером ему позвонил незнакомец из швейцарской стратегической разведки (тогда при Минобороны) и пригласил на встречу в Берне: его статьи уже были собраны. Его сразу назначили главой отдела Варшавского договора — Бо считает это повышением. Параллельно он командовал элитной ротой, затем батальоном танков «Леопард», стал полковником и полковником Генштаба, пройдя подготовку, достаточную для звания генерала.
Он учился в Великобритании (контрразведка и безопасность) и в США (Defense Intelligence College на базе Боллинг). Швейцарская служба, по его словам, была крошечной и аналитической — по образцу Бюро разведки и исследований Госдепартамента США — и сотрудничала с французской, американской, британской, итальянской службами. Бо работал как аналитик-гражданский, но выезжал на место: оценивал оружие Варшавского договора за рубежом. Он был одним из первых европейцев, увидевших в южной Анголе по приглашению южноафриканской разведки захваченные ПЗРК советского производства; по пути из Южной Африки в Намибию самолёт обстреляли ракетой, и пилоту пришлось уходить манёвром. Он писал полевые наставления об угрозе Варшавского договора, был наблюдателем ОБСЕ и участвовал в испытаниях трофейного восточногерманского оружия вместе с немцами.
Риттер подчёркивает различие между кабинетным аналитиком и человеком с «тренированным глазом», способным связать данные с военной реальностью. Оба разделяют этос: аналитик не угождает начальству и не пишет, что тому хочется услышать, а кладёт факты на стол; решения принимают выбранные политики. Бо говорит, что так учили и его в США и Великобритании, и именно таким принципом — фактичность и объективность — он руководствуется в книгах.
Терроризм, миротворчество, разминирование
В 1970–80-е терроризм был связан с левой идеологией и Варшавским договором (немецкие и итальянские «Красные бригады», бельгийские «Боевые коммунистические ячейки»); когда Швейцария создала правительственную группу по заложникам и терактам, Бо включили в неё. Позднее он написал книги о джихадистском терроризме.
После холодной войны Швейцария стала активнее участвовать в миротворчестве ООН. Бо попал в Центральную Африку: он был направлен для защиты полутора миллионов руандийских беженцев в Заире (ныне ДР Конго). В 1980-е он был связан с афганским сопротивлением Ахмад-Шаха Масуда, для которого написал краткое руководство по обращению с советскими минами-«бабочками» (по-французски, так как Масуд учился во французском лицее в Кабуле). К середине 1990-х он предложил создать центр сбора данных о минах и ПО для сопоставления информации из затронутых стран; после Оттавской конференции 1997 года он из Нью-Йорка основал то, что сегодня стало Женевским международным центром гуманитарного разминирования (около 70 стран), перенеся методологию разведанализа с танковых батальонов на противопехотную угрозу.
Судан
Опыт заставил ООН поручить ему создание разведструктуры для миротворческих операций. Классический «батальонный» тактический разведчик не годится для стратегических задач, а в 1990-е операции стали гражданско-военными, включающими строительство мира и нации. В Судане (2005–2006), стране размером с Западную Европу, Бо возглавил первый Объединённый (в варианте Бо — унифицированный, чтобы не звучало слишком военно) центр анализа и оценки миссии, вероятно крупнейший за историю ООН. Центру приходилось учитывать около 100 вооружённых групп: порядка 80 на юге, 10–15 в Дарфуре, ещё около десяти на востоке. Сложность была и терминологическая: в ООН избегали слова «разведка», подменяя его «информацией», тогда как информация — сырые данные, а разведка — оценённый продукт. Позже Бо возглавил отдел политики и доктрины миротворческих операций ООН и два года работал для Африканского союза в Найроби.
Бо рассказывает два эпизода. Во время столкновения двух племён (одновременно вооружённых групп) он с бывшим голландским спецназовцем был высажен вертолётом в глуши без связи; неделю они вели «челночную дипломатию» между сторонами, опираясь на составленную командой «параллельную схему» личных связей, родства и точек давления, и разрешили конфликт, после чего гуманитарный персонал смог вернуться. В начале 2006 года, в разгар скандала вокруг карикатур на Мухаммеда, миссии ООН с датскими и норвежскими офицерами поступили угрозы; Бо встретился с представителем радикального крыла «Братьев-мусульман» и, по его словам, снял угрозу личной беседой («мы с вами поклоняемся одному Богу»).
Риттер называет это не просто разведкой, а операциями и дипломатией, сравнимыми с работой спецназа и парамилитарных офицеров ЦРУ, и описывает Бо как «одного из самых разносторонних разведчиков мира» — от постановки задач и сбора до оценки и отчёта, чему способствует малый размер швейцарской службы (где аналитик видит весь цикл, как директор ЦРУ, а в крупных службах — узкую часть).
НАТО и Украина
Затем Бо перешёл в НАТО в Брюсселе: пять лет возглавлял малое подразделение по борьбе с распространением стрелкового оружия при отделе контроля над вооружениями; его начальник был американцем. С 2014 года вопрос — откуда у повстанцев Донбасса оружие. Бо утверждает, что внутри НАТО давили, чтобы признать: оружие идёт из России, тогда как имеющиеся у него данные и снимки ясно показывали, что повстанцы получали его от дезертиров из украинской армии. (Это утверждение противоречит более поздним оценкам западных и независимых расследователей, документировавших поставки из России; тут перед нами позиция Бо и Риттера, не общепризнанный факт.)
Он дважды ездил в Украину: как эксперт по реформе сектора безопасности в рамках программы «Партнёрство ради мира» участвовал в миссии НАТО по реформированию украинской армии, а также помогал организовать разминирование Донбасса. В октябре 2014 года он находился в Одессе, где, по его описанию, весь юг Украины «восставал» против Киева («Объединённые силы Новороссии»), а весь Черноморский флот Украины, «от адмирала до последнего матроса», будто бы перешёл к русским; эти его утверждения о масштабе южного восстания и событиях 2014 года резко расходятся с общепринятой хронологией (переход касался Крыма и Севастополя в марте, а в Одессе массового восстания не было). Он замечает, что военная доктрина и мышление современной России во многом схожи с советскими, если убрать идеологию.
Отставка и значение
Бо досрочно ушёл в отставку на год-два раньше срока, потому что обжился в Бельгии, нашёл друзей и не хотел возвращаться в Швейцарию, где его ждала бы малозначимая должность. Риттер завершает словами благодарности, называя Бо «гражданином мира и героем человечества».
Значимость
Интервью — не новость, а портрет: оно легитимизирует Бо как авторитетного эксперта для американской аудитории перед последующими публикациями о его санкционном преследовании. Критически важно, что рассказ строится на самоописании и добродушных вопросах Риттера без проверки, а спорные тезисы о 2014 годе (оружие повстанцев, масштаб «восстания» на юге) подаются как факты.
🧾 Транскрипт (формат)
Introducing Jacques Baud
Источник: https://scottritter.substack.com/p/introducing-jacques-baud
When the Founding Fathers of the United States came together and wrote the Constitution, this body of laws that define who Americans are, what Americans are, by saying that we have values, that we have things that we believe in, when they came together, the first amendment to the Constitution was freedom of speech. And an important thing about freedom of speech is that this isn't something that the People were asking permission of the government to possess. You see, the Constitution begins, we the people of the United States. This means that we, the people, are in charge. We weren't asking permission of the government to have free speech. What we were telling the government is, free speech is an unalienable right given to us by a higher being. And we're telling the government, you can't touch it. It's our right to speak freely, not just because it's Fun to do, because it's an inherent part of being a human being.
Free expression of what you believe in, who you want to associate with, what you think is cool, what you think is not cool. The government has no business infringing on free speech. And in the United States, this is one of the core values. Now, we Americans like to say, we like to lead by example and say that we are who we are. We know that America is not faultless and the history of America is full of mistakes that are made. But the one thing that I think almost everybody could agree on is that this value, this free speech right, is one of the things that sets America apart. Now, we have allies and friends around the world, and we like to call the Europeans our friends and allies. But are they? Because when it comes to this fundamental American value, This free speech, and it's not an American value. We just put it in our Constitution. It's a human value. It's what gives humanity its essence, the ability to say, I am who I am.
When it comes to this value, Europe is not performing well. And I think it's time that we take a closer look at that. This is why it's an honor and privilege for me to be here today in Brussels, Belgium with Jacques Beaune. Jacques, thank you for coming.
Hi, Scott. Thank you for visiting me here in Brussels.
Thank you. We're going to have a conversation about free speech and everything and about you. But I think what we need to do, first of all, is introduce you to an American audience. Now, we can read the bio statement. You're a Swiss intelligence officer. That always sounds pretty cool because it's like a neutral intelligence officer. How does that work? But you're an intelligence officer, you're a colonel, so you're a military man. And we know that you've written extensively about issues such as Ukraine, the conflict in Ukraine. Let's start at the very beginning. When I look at your resume, I think it's a seven-year period where you were working for the Swiss Intelligence Service. How did that happen? What is the Swiss Intelligence Service? Were you in the military? Were you a civilian? And why did you decide to become a Swiss Intelligence Officer?
Well, it's an interesting question. As you said, I'm a Swiss citizen. In Switzerland, we At that time, today it has changed a little bit, but at that time, I mean, talking about the 70s, 80s, we had no professional army. We had only what we call a militia army. We are old and I am also a citizen soldier, meaning that we had a civilian life and a military life power. And in my case, I graduated in Geneva. I was born and raised in Geneva. I graduated from Geneva University in econometrics and I started my military duty as a normal soldier and I was promoted, became officer. I was commissioned 50 years ago, exactly. Almost day per day today. And I was always interested by military issues. So, parallel to my study, I was also writing articles. I was correspondent of several military reviews in England, Italy. And I wrote about geopolitics already at that time. I was quite young. And Surprisingly, well, it's almost like a movie.
One day or one evening, better said, I received a call at home. Someone called me and said, are you Jacobo? He said, yes. Would you like to work with us? I said, who are you? The guy said, well, he didn't introduce himself, by the way. I didn't know who he was. I said, well, I can't tell you on the phone. I said, well, I'm interested. And in fact, he was a guy from the Swiss Strategic Intelligence. And we met just a week or two weeks later in Bern at the headquarters of the Swiss Strategic Intelligence. That was part of the Department of Defense at the time. And they had all the articles I wrote. They had all documented. I said, well, we have read that. And can you consider working for us? I said, well, why not? And they said, well, with your knowledge and your level of expertise, we'll put you directly. And that was, at that time, I didn't realize at that very moment, but that was... In itself a promotion because they said we put you directly into the office that works with the Soviet threat, Soviet forces.
And I went directly as a head of the Warsaw Pact section, if you want, dealing with all the Warsaw Pact
forces, basically.
I was officer in the army. I was at that time, I was almost to be promoted. I mean, I had already, I was qualified to be company commander, I think captain. And so everything was okay. I had the military knowledge, I had all that. And I started as a military, I mean, strategic intelligence. And that became my civilian role. Job, so to say. I said I was a citizen soldier. My citizen work was in the strategic intelligence, but parallel to that, I was commander of a company, an elite company, and then later I became a battalion commander of a leopard battalion, and later I was promoted to the rank of colonel, and then colonel of the general staff, which is As in the German system, a general staff officer is an officer that is prepared for all the tasks that are required in army level or army corps level tasks. So I know logistics, aviation operation, Ground operations, engineers, all that. I have special training for all these specialties.
And I was even, in fact, qualified to become general in reality. So I follow all the training and all that to be general. So that's my military career. And as I said, my civilian career was in the strategic intelligence. In Strategic Intelligence, as I said, I was specialized for the Warsaw Pact. I was sent for training in the UK, in the UK intelligence, and in the US. For those who are familiar with that in the US, I was...
When you say intelligence, though, they read your articles. Correct. So are they hiring you as an analyst? Yes. Or are they hiring you as a spy? No, no.
That's a good question. No, no, no, no. They hired me as an analyst. And you have also to understand that, especially at that time, Switzerland had, I mean, was a neutral country. And we are a tiny service, a tiny intelligence service. We couldn't afford, we had no... Today, they expanded a little bit this capacity, built capability and capacity. But at that time, it was essentially an analytical intelligence, very much like you have the Intelligence Research Bureau in the State Department, very similar to that. And so my work was essentially intelligence. I had, although Switzerland was neutral, we were working with so-called Friendly services, French services, and I was working with US, UK, French, Italian, working with all intelligence services, and we had regular visits and contacts with all of them. I can say that today because it has been reported in, there was some kind of parliamentarian inquiry about the work of intelligence, and all that has been exposed, so I can talk about it.
In my case, I was trained, as I said, in the U.S. I was trained in Bollinger Air Force Base, so the Defense Intelligence College, which is essentially an intelligence analysis college. And I was there for a while in the U.S., a very fascinating experience, by the way, very interesting. It was an extremely valuable training that I received there, to be frank. Any case, that was my job and I was responsible for all the Warsaw Pact, including those Warsaw Pact forces that were In other countries, just like in Afghanistan, for instance, I was also in touch with the Afghan resistance and also in other places such as Angola, for instance. And since Switzerland at that time, because it didn't belong to the UN, it didn't take part to the embargo against South Africa. So Sweden had privileged contact with South African intelligence. So when the Soviets and the East Germans trained in Angola and especially used or tested their weapons, such as the, you know, the man pads, the AC-16 or things like that.
It was not 18, it was 14 and 16 that we knew were in East Germany, but we never observed it in East Germany. And I was one of the first Europeans to see them in Angola, invited by the South African intelligence in southern Angola to see those weapons that were captured by the South African intelligence. So that was quite interesting because then I could make the first technical assessment about these weapons for the Swiss intelligence.
And for your friends.
Exactly. Thank you. Although, to be frank with you, I suspect the US had been there before me.
We haven't had that parliamentary inquiry yet.
We'll keep it silent, but it's a suspicion. In any case, that was interesting, by the way, because when I went there, we flew from South Africa to Namibia. And during the flight, we were under fire from a man-pad, so the Swapu one man-pad, AC-7, and the pilot had to make some escape maneuver to escape the missile. Were you advising him? Look, I just studied this missile. Well, in fact, I had my belt fastened. Well, that's a fascinating experience as well.
Now, this is as a civilian.
Well, that was a civilian, although, you know, this was a very strange situation because obviously, technically, officially, I was a civilian, but practically, they were taking advantage of my military knowledge and my military experience.
But when you were on the ground, you didn't go up in uniform, you came as a civilian.
Correct. I was always, yes, I was always a civilian. So that was my job, to assess the level of the Warsaw Pact threat. And I wrote several, I mean, of course, as you probably do in your own life, where you write reports, you write all that, and the whole. How to say that? Field manuals and things like this. I authored, I mean, not just myself. I had also colleagues and it's just not like my books. My books are those who I write myself. But here for those field manuals, obviously it was a team, but we wrote a field manual on the Russian or the Soviet or Warsaw Pact threat, meaning the doctrine, the equipment, operations, and things like this. So I was literally, as you rightly pointed out, I was an analyst.
But more than an analyst, because again, an analyst is somebody who sits behind a desk and sort of You were in the field.
So you're doing collection.
You're doing technical collection.
It's a little bit of both, but it's not espionage. Correct. You're not a spy. You are going on the field to observe and see things. And I have been there also with other intelligence services. I work But it was about observing, assessing also with the Germans. We were participating to, for instance, field testing because the Germans collected a lot of East German weapons, for instance, and we were invited for the test of those weapons to see what they can achieve and what are the limitations and things like this. It's not spying, but it's also some kind of intelligence collection. People don't understand the word analytics because we have, as you rightly said, we have this picture of the guy, I mean, the academic analyst who reads a lot of books and things like this, and obviously... My desk was full of a lot of documents. I barely had any document below the level of secrets on my desk. But besides this, you also go in the field to check the reality of things and to observe.
I was also an observer. When you had the OSC, I mean, when we had OSC observations, you remember these... When we exchange observers, all came from intelligent services from all over Europe. So we were almost a family. And people I met during my training course, when it was in the US or UK, I met them as OSCE observers.
But, I mean, just again, to highlight for an audience, this is an important distinction because, I mean, look, I have nothing against academics. I mean, some of the smartest people in the world are academics who, you know, write books, they're in archives, they're doing the reading. It's a very valuable skill. But you have a trained set of eyeballs, meaning that you can see something, And then you can attach it to a military reality. Exactly. Before you put it to paper. Correct. Which is a completely different skill set. It means that you're writing these documents you write. It's not an academic exercise. Absolutely. When we wrote those, for instance, manuals on Soviet tactics and things like this, I had my own
A background as commander. So you can relate that exactly as you explained. You can relate what was reported from the East. You could relate that to a field experience or an experience with your own knowledge, meaning that you give some Flesh on the bone, if I can put it that way. So you're right to explain this. I mean, intelligence analysis is not simply a guy who reads books. It's much more than this. It requires a lot of expertise. Another aspect that needs to be underlined, and that explains also then the spirit of the books I write today, is that When I was an analyst, I mean, a strategic analyst, so you have the intelligence analyst, but you have the strategic analyst. He provides analysis for the government, meaning that based on your papers, the government, we suppose, is shaping policies, foreign policies, meaning that You are not elected. You are, in fact, a servant and you provide information for those who are elected and make policy.
So it's not up to you to make the policy. As an analyst, you provide the information as objective, as factual as it should be. And that's up to the politician, to the minister or whoever, then to take that information to probably take whatever they need to take in order to shape a policy. They make the policy, not you. That's very important because I tried also in my books to be as factual and objective as possible because it's not up to me. To shape the policies. That's my fundamental position when I write things.
When I went through the Marine Corps Intelligence Officers course, they told me your job isn't to write what your boss wants to hear.
Exactly.
Your job is to put the facts on the table. And then your boss has to deal with those facts. But if you're trying to please a boss, you're not a good analyst.
You're a very bad analyst. This is absolutely true. And in fact, you know, it's interesting, but I told you I was trained in the US and they told us exactly the same thing. That was, at that time, it was normal for an intelligence analyst not to agree with the boss. And in fact, it was not recommended to be against it. That's not the purpose. You don't need to be against the boss. It's not the purpose. But you don't need to please the boss.
You remind the boss what the facts are.
Exactly. You can like them or not, but these are the facts. And that's up to you. To shape a policy based on those facts and that's exactly the spirit and I remember that it's very fascinating that you say this because it's exactly what we were told many times and also in the UK, by the way, that was exactly the same idea, although in the UK my training was more related to. The security side of intelligence was more related to counter-terrorism and things like this. So it's a little bit different. But in the US, the strategic intelligence was absolutely about this. You use the facts, you base your analysis on facts, and then the politicians have to do their job based on this. We hope they do a good job.
Well, that's another topic. In your resume, during the time that you were with the Civilian Intelligence Service, I saw you had two job descriptions. One was the Warsaw Pact analyst, but the other one you mentioned you went to the UK to get some counter-terrorism type training. You were also responsible for counter-terrorism.
Well, that's very strange for a lot of people, including for me, by the way, because... Well, we have first to remember that in the 70s and 80s, terrorism was very much related to the Soviet and Warsaw Pact foreign policy. It was about Marxist terrorism. We were not talking about Islamist terrorism at that time. It probably existed, but not in the form we know it today. At that time, it was Communists, I mean, you had the Begater, or say the Red Brigades in Italy, or you had in France, and even here in Belgium, the Cellules Communistes Combatants, the Combatant Communist cells here in Belgium. We saw a very tight link between the Warsaw Pact and terrorism. That's the first aspect. And secondly, Well, Switzerland as a country had not really an experience on terrorism, but in the 80s, as we started to witness terrorism a little bit everywhere, the Swiss government established a special task force related to the government to deal with hostage situation and terrorist activities that would directly affect Switzerland.
And since there were not so many experts on that, and I was the one dealing with the Warsaw Pact, they asked me to be part of that task force. And that's also because I had this background in the UK as on the security intelligence and this kind of things. So that I merged two specialties, if you want. Today, that would be two separate issue. But at that time, And we have also to consider that Switzerland had not been on the forefront of the counter-terrorism. I mean, this is an issue we had never really to deal with, to be honest. We had a few instances where the government was involved in taking decisions because we had citizens that had been hijacked by terrorists and things like this. It was rather the exception, to be honest. So I have also this aspect, which led me, by the way, to study more closely terrorism as part of the Marxist doctrine, but also later as part of the Islamist evolution that you had.
And I wrote several books on Fighting jihadi terrorism and things like this, because I continued to have an intellectual interest for that. But my first specialty was definitely the strategic intelligence of, let's say, the conventional threat, if you want.
You did that job for seven years, and then at some point you transitioned to the military full-time. What caused you to make that transition?
Well, in fact, this was at the end of the Cold War. Things changed a little bit. The real change was that Switzerland became more involved in matters related to peacekeeping and working for the UN. And here we needed to have more. Switzerland had not really an expertise on that. They needed people who had, let's say, better knowledge of not just the Swiss armed forces, but the foreign armed forces. And therefore, I was asked by the Swiss government, and in particular, the foreign affairs, to get more involved in issues related, yes, to peace game, It started with the issue in Rwanda. And the problem was at that time that you had one and a half million Rwandan refugees in Congo, what is today the Democratic Republic of Congo, which was still Zaire at that time. And Switzerland was asked to provide officers to ensure the security of those refugees. There were threats of ethnic cleansing and things like this.
They asked me, since I had some knowledge of Africa, some knowledge about terrorism and things like this, so they asked me to go there and I was there working for the UN and then I stayed on that path, if you want. And that led me to have a military carrier, but more related to the work with foreign affairs, with observation. Then I worked with the, after that, I worked in the demining and humanitarian demining. Because during my time as intelligence, I told you I was in touch with the Afghan resistance. I was in touch with the Ahmed Shah Massoud resistance. And when they had this threat of those, you know, the butterfly mines, and that was a serious concern for humanitarian organization, but I was intelligence at that time. And because I had this relation with the Afghan resistance, And based on my knowledge, because I had all the technical documents about those mines, so I wrote a small manual, a very simplified handbook on how to, not disarm, because it was not about disarming the butterfly mine, but how to handle them.
And I also took advantage of that handbook to explain who to disarm anti-tank mines and this kind of things. And this was written in Pashto? That was written in French because Ahmed Shah Massoud had been trained in the French lycée in Kabul and he knew French. And I addressed that to him. He translated it. Now, did you travel to Afghanistan? No.
I was going to ask if you had one of those cool Mujahideen pictures where you had the hat on.
No, no, no. I went later. I went later to Afghanistan. But at that particular time, no, I didn't. I wasn't allowed to do that. I was not allowed to go in the Warsaw Pact either at that time because I was an analyst.
Well, your desk had nothing but top secret documents. No, no, no. But there were some limitations.
At that time, I went later to Afghanistan. When the NATO was there, then I went to Afghanistan.
When you did the demining, was this Were you primarily desk bound or did you actually go to the field to collect technical intelligence on mines and things of that nature?
No. So during my intelligence phase, when I wrote this handbook for the Afghan resistance that was based on the assessment we made on those mines and things like that. It was extremely basic, to be honest. It was just a help. But the thing is that because I studied mining and things like this, when They asked me, there was the issue of humanitarian demining in the mid 90s. I said, well, you're the only one who has some knowledge about foreign landmines and things like this. Probably you can help. But in reality, my work was not so much the nitty gritty of demining. It was because when Switzerland started to get engaged in those humanitarian demining issues, They asked me, what could Switzerland possibly do to improve the situation of those anti-personal mind? And I said, well, when I wrote my handbook, my problem was to have intelligence about this land mind, this mind. What are they? Where are they?
And things like this. I was working intelligence, which was not a problem for me, but I realized that it was an essential problem if you want to deal with this issue. So I said, well, Switzerland should have a kind of intelligence center that collects information over landmines in the world, have a software that allows the different offices in affected countries to collect information and to drag that information to a center that could be Geneva. And the front office said, well, that's a brilliant idea. You go to New York. You work for the UN and in New York, you built up this center as a Swiss contribution to the Ottawa conference that happened in 1997. And that's what I worked out from New York. I created what has become today the Geneva Center for Humanitarian Demining, which is based in Geneva. With an information management system for main action that collects information from, I think today it's about 70 countries, that pools information on mines, minefields.
Victims and so on and so forth in order to make assessment, strategic assessment about how to allocate money or programs and so on to help contributing countries to assess. So I was not involved in directly demining, in a direct demining. But I was involved, if you want, the intelligence that supports, the strategic intelligence that supports humanitarian demining. That was, that's my, what I, the idea I brought, and that's what is today active in Geneva. And for the UN, as a contribution to the UN. So it, basically, it's a continuation of my intelligence analytical approach. I simply translated the methodology of intelligence analysis, but instead of analyzing troops and tank battalions and so on in Eastern Europe, I used the same methodology to assess the anti-personal threat in the world.
When you went to the United Nations, did you work under the auspices of peacekeeping? Correct. So the demining work that you're doing is under the auspices of DPKO? Absolutely. Okay. But then later on, you have a fascinating resume, I have to say. It's amazing. Later on, you did some time in Sudan, I believe. Correct. With also DPKO.
Absolutely. Well, what happened in that is that... Because what I created for Humanity and Demining was so effective, the UN asked the Swiss government to send me again to create an intelligence structure for peacekeeping operation. Because in peacekeeping, in traditional peacekeeping, you just send blue helmets. These are military people and military people know about intelligence. Essentially you send a battalion, or a regiment, or the equivalent of that, and they have an intelligence structure. You have a battalion intelligence officer. But there are two problems. First of all, when you send a battalion, the intelligence officer is a tactical intelligence officer, while the task of a peacekeeping battalion is in fact strategic. Meaning that suddenly you are you're dealing with forces that are much beyond the scope of a tactical intelligence officer. That's the first problem. The second problem is that in the 90s, the peacekeeping operation started to change.
It was no longer about sending blue helmets, but you have a civilian military Peacekeeping operation where civilians and military were operating together. It was not not simply and that's exactly what happened in Sudan. By the way, it was not just about keeping peace, but it was also they had a component of peace building and nation building, especially in South Sudan. Therefore, the intelligence, the traditional Military intelligence was not enough to support this kind of mission. You needed to have an intelligence structure that combined both military capabilities, but also civilian capabilities. And that's why the UN asked me to build up the, and I think that was even the biggest that has been made by the By the UN, in fact, we had this UMAC or JMAC, Joint Military Analysis Assessment Center in Sudan. I said UMAC because the special representative preferred to have a unified mission analysis center rather than a joint, because joint sounded too military.
Anyway, but the idea is the same, meaning that you had both Military analysts and civilian analysts working together in order to assess the situation in the whole of Sudan. We also have to understand that at that time when you had Sudan was not split yet and Sudan had the surface of the whole Europe. That was the largest country in Africa, meaning that you had something like 2,000 kilometers from north to south and something like 1,000 kilometers east from west. So it was a huge, almost continent-sized country with problems in the south, problems in the east, and problems in Darfur in the west. In the west, yes, in Darfur. So you had to cope with all these issues, and that's why you needed to have this multidimensional intelligence. And that's why I was supposed to create it. That's the reason why I went there, and I led this very first JMAC, which, as I said, was probably the biggest that ever existed so far, and had to deal with both Darfur crisis, the Saturn, the...
The situation in South Sudan with something something like 80 armored groups there. We had about 10 to 15 armored groups in Darfur and you had another probably 10 armored groups in the in the east of Sudan. So you are dealing with almost 100 armored groups with different objectives and dealing so and I had with my team, we had a very good team, by the way, with a lot of very experienced people. And we were in touch with all these guys. And that provided we had, I think, at that time, we had the best analysis office in the whole Africa. I mean, in military operation at that stage.
You know, I had the privilege of working for the United Nations for a little while. And I remember our mission transitioned from traditional arms control to forensic arms control. And we had to create an intelligence organization. And the UN just doesn't do intelligence organizations. That's a different experience. You built this organization. And the reason why I'm bringing this up is I know for a fact that You were totally on your own. And I don't know this because I know you. I know this because I know the United Nations. And they gave you a job where there was no UN field manual on how to do intelligence. So you started from scratch and you built the largest civil military affairs intelligence unit in history.
Absolutely. That's a little bit my history. I was always for impossible tasks. But then for things where you had no precedent and you had to build everything from scratch. And it's even more tricky because in the UN, there's a reluctance to talk. Even the word intelligence.
Information.
Exactly. They prefer to use it. And as an intelligence officer, and you know that better than me, The word information has a specific meaning in the intelligence process. In fact, this is the start of the intelligence process. And at the end of the intelligence process, you have intelligence, intelligence being a product. And so when you start using the word information for intelligence, you are mixing up two different things. And that was a hard job in the UN and later because later I was asked to head the office of policy and doctrine of peace cooperation and in that capacity I tried to Come back with the word intelligence and it's extraordinarily difficult to explain to people that information is not intelligence and information mostly is something that has not been. Raw data. It's raw, exactly. That's everything you can take from any paper without being qualified and things like this.
While intelligence is a product, that's something that has been already thought about, the information has been Evaluated, has been qualified, and based on that, you establish a product that has a quality. You can rely on intelligence while you cannot rely on information.
Now, I just want to help the audience understand because intelligence is a funny world. We established that you were a strategic intelligence officer. Correct. But we also established that you were a Technical Intelligence Officer. And then you had some field experience. And then you went to Africa and you got some more field experience. But there's a military operator. But now you're in Sudan. A hundred armed groups. This isn't strategic analysis. This isn't technical analysis. You're getting into the human intelligence here. You're getting into the human factor where you're meeting people. You have to talk to people. You have to establish relationships. You have to balance the politics of the parties. This is a completely different skill set than your normal strategic analyst. So I just bring it up because I think what you did in Sudan is remarkable. And I also think that it... You've broadened your intelligence skill set.
You're more than just a strategic analyst, technical. You are perhaps one of the most well-rounded intelligence officers in the world today because of your experience.
Well, you see, it's a very interesting point you are bringing up here. You know, I told you that when I was working in strategic intelligence in Switzerland, we had a very tiny intelligence service. I compared that to the Intelligence Research Bureau of the State Department. So it's almost one of the smallest intelligence services in the U.S., by the way. By the way, it's interesting because when you had this inquiry about 9-11, I think, or I don't remember which inquiry from these committees on intelligence, and they found that this INR was in fact the best intelligence for analysis.
Best analytical group.
Exactly. Because it's very small. And that's the advantage I had, because when you, you see, intelligence is a complex process, as we said. When you are in a very small intelligence organization, you can see the whole scope of the process. You know, from the collection to the final product, you see almost everything. If you are in a huge intelligence organization, such as CIA or things like that, or other similar organizations, Everything is very much compartmented for security reason and things like that. And it's a huge organization. It's very, the only person who has the overview on the whole process is in fact the guy on the top or probably the couple of directors that are on the top. Meaning that when you are in the Swiss intelligence, you see the whole, your angle of vision And what you see is almost the same as the director of the CIA. Of course, when you go in the CIA, you have, and I have to, I met some when I was on training in the US, brilliant analysts in CIA and DIA, by the way, brilliant people.
But all are very much in very tiny segmented parts, and they are excellent in their topic, in their domain. The thing is that, of course, in Switzerland, you cannot afford to have such degree of specialization. Intelligence is more a generalist issue. You keep the overview on things. You try to have the broad picture rather than going to the detail. I mean, you are a specialist in nuclear weapons and things like this. We never had the degree of specialization that you may have in the US when it comes to nuclear weapons, for instance.
Let me just correct the record here. Because I don't want to thank you very much for the compliment. But, you know, there's two ways to become an expert. Let's say one is the Swiss way, your way, where you actually do the work and you become an expert. The other way is my way. To be the first person in the world to do it. Because by definition, if you're the first person, you're the only person and you become the expert. And so I have to acknowledge that there's better people out there than me. You are an expert too.
You are also, I mean, you're too modest. In any case, what I mean is that in the US, as is in many other countries that can afford to have an extensive intelligence structure, you can have a degree of expertise that is extremely, extremely deep. While in a small intelligence organization, you have to keep the... The broad picture, the big picture, as we tend to say.
But again, I want to round this out because, again, people will say, Jacques Baud, Swiss intelligence officer. And they hear that term intelligence. But as you point out, I mean, if you turn on the TV today, you know, you'll get, you know, Steve Hall, former CIA intelligence officer. So-and-so, former intelligence officer. And as you said, they may be very good at this very slender thing. But... We talk about the transformation of information to intelligence. I don't know what they call this. We go through the collection management plan. So, you know, direction, collection, assessment, reporting, direction, the whole thing. And through all that, you have little segments where there's intelligence officers. And they're very good at that little segment. But when you unplug them and put them into another segment, they have no idea what they're talking about. Now we have Jacques Baud, who is direction, collection, assessment, backup.
Because it's easier when you come from a small
organization. But that's not the point is... When we say intelligence officer for you, we mean somebody who can talk about the entire scope and breadth of the intelligence business. So you're more than just an intelligence officer, you're an intelligent intelligence officer. But this is important because when people talk about you and refer to you, I think it's essential that people understand the depth of your experience and your expertise. You're not just an intelligence officer who sat at a counterterrorism desk for five years or a guy who ran Moscow Station for five years. They're probably pretty good at what they did. But you're a guy who was in the Sudan building an intelligence organization from scratch who knows the politics of direction, the technicalities of collection, the academic... Requirements of assessment and then also the ability to report back so that you get direction again.
I just think it's important that people understand that we're not talking about, you know, you're a very complex person. Let's put it that way.
Thank you. Yes, your description is correct. And in addition to that, when we talk about, for instance, my job in Sweden, we were reporting to the Security Council, meaning that you cannot bullshit people, as you could say. I mean, you have to remain... Politically correct, factually correct, and all that. So there are an extraordinary number of limitations and you have to be really Extremely cautious. So you cannot make your own assessment as you wish it were. You have to portray things as they are. And that's my culture, my personal culture when it comes to analysis and intelligence work.
Now, I heard a rumor, you can correct it or not, but When in Sudan, you weren't just behind the desk, that you actually went to the field? Correct. And that you may have been in a situation that required what we call a little bit of courage or heroism. Can you tell us about this?
Well, since we were in touch with, as I told you about, in the southern part at least 80 armed groups, When those armed groups started to confront each other, the UN was not in a position to intervene in that conflict. And the philosophy of the representative of the secret general was to try to settle the conflict. But there were not many people who knew those people. So... On one instance, for instance, we had a fight between two tribes, which incidentally were also two different armed groups because those armed groups are organized tribally. So with my team, we had the organigram of those armed groups. We knew how much brigades or things like that they had. But beside this, we made an assessment of Which are their personal relationships? Who was at school together? Who has parents? Because they have parenthood between the two tribes. So who is parent of whom? Who knows whom? Who has ties with Khartoum?
Who has ties with someone in the government? Where are the pressure points and things like this? And we made kind of a parallel. Organigram of the situation. And based on that, I went on the field. And of course, you are, as I told you, Sudan is a country that was as big as Western Europe. So the representative told me, you deal with the situation, you try to put those two tribes To solve the problem. So I went there with a helicopter with one of my team who was former Dutch Special Forces. Very good guy, by the way. And we were dropped there with a helicopter in the middle of nowhere. No contact. There's no cell phone, obviously none. A radio was too far away. So no radio contact was nothing. So we were dropped there in the middle of nowhere in a place that was close to those tribes. We had a contact there who brought us with a Jeep and we went. So we were here for one week and the helicopter comes.
Russian-speaking? Belarusian, I think. There were Belarusians coming and said, well, we should come back in one week and we hoped we'd be at the same place. And then you go there and you start to make kind of a shuttle diplomacy between the two tribes to explain the position and try to solve the issue. We managed that. But that was because we knew exactly who were the guys, what are the pressure points, and things like this. And we could handle the discussion with those. And during one week, we shuttled between the two tribes. Eventually, we solved the issue. And the UN had to withdraw all the personnel before. I could call my boss and say, well, you can bring the humanitarian personnel back because the issue has been settled. So these are the kind of issues we could do because we had the profound knowledge of Those structures that were there, those tribal structures, and beyond this, because again, in Africa, personal relationship is essential if you want to solve an issue.
Sometimes when you look on maps and in papers, you have this tribe or this armed group, and you think, well, this is like an armed For me, like in the West, it's more complex than this. And in Africa, if you know people, if you understand them, you can solve any situation. We had, for instance, in 2000, I was there in 2005, 2006. And in early 2006, we had... An issue with the those cartoons. You remember those cartoons of Mohammed and you had all these riots across the world and The mission, the UN mission in Sudan received explicit threats because we had Danish and Norwegian officers in the mission. And therefore, we had concrete threats that there would be some bombing or things like that. So the special representative asked me the question. I said, well, we have some contacts with those guys from the Muslim Brotherhood. It was an extreme faction of that. We had some contact with them. We can probably talk to them.
And that's what the special representative told me, okay, Jacques, go. So I went there and we arranged a meeting with those guys. And that was a fascinating meeting, to be honest, because we're in the middle of this frenzy about those caricatures. And when I met the guy, I remember I entered the room and this guy made a comment about the Christians. I said, well, beware, because you and I have the same God. He said, you're right. He smiled at me and said, sit and let's talk. And we have talked. And he explained to me, explained to me the rationale. I asked him, well, those cartoons. So we talked about this. And after a while, I said, well, now, Should I worry for my mission about the threat? I said, no, we have talked. Problem solved. You will have nothing. And we didn't have anything.
See, again, I just want to highlight this. This is more than intelligence. This is operations. This is diplomacy. This is the kind of stuff that, I mean, if you look at the United States equivalent, this is what special operations personnel do, special forces personnel. The CIA have paramilitary case officers who will do this kind of work. And it's a very specialized skill.
Absolutely.
And you have done this at the highest level in some of the most complicated areas. Situations, I'm just in awe. I mean, it's amazing that you, you know, what this is. Now, at some point in time, though, your UN experience came to an end, and you transitioned, I guess, back to Europe, to NATO, and you went to work for NATO?
Yes, well, as I said, after my stay in Sudan, I was also asked by the UN to deal with the doctrine of peacekeeping operations. I did that for two years. Peacekeeping operations, not special operations. Peacekeeping operations. Which is a special operation.
Which is a special operation itself.
Okay. Okay. And then I did the same job for the African Union for almost two years in Nairobi. And then I had the opportunity, my government asked me, I had the opportunity to go to NATO. And I didn't know NATO as a, I mean, I knew NATO as an organization, as everybody knows, but I had no experience working effectively. Within NATO. So I seized the opportunity and I headed a small unit in the NATO here in Brussels to counter proliferation, small arms proliferation. That was a small unit within the arms control section division of the NATO. And my boss was an American, by the way, a very good, very good, very intelligent guy, by the way. Anyway. So I spent here, I spent there most five years working on counter-proliferation of small arms. We were dealing with the issues that, of course, in Afghanistan, but from 2014, of course, the issue of Donbass came, and the question was, where do these rebels in Donbass get their weapons from?
And that's where, of course, I was at the forefront of observing what was going on in the region.
Literally full circle. Exactly. You start your career as a Warsaw Pact observer at the Soviet Union, and now you're at NATO.
Exactly, exactly the same thing. So it's fascinating because from a military standpoint, from a political standpoint, there are a lot of difference between Russia today and the Soviet Union. There is no question
about this.
But when you go look at it from a military standpoint, there is a lot of similarities. I mean, the spirit, the doctrine, the mindset and all that has remained very much similar. You can remove all the political issues and ideological issues, but when you have removed that, you see that there is a lot of similarities in the way of conceiving operations. For instance, the How the whole thing works, how the system, the military system works. And therefore, I was, as you rightly said, I was back to the origin in studying this aspect. And of course, there was another dimension because obviously you had rebels in Ukraine and there was a lot of pressure within NATO to Understand, no, there was not pressure to understand, it was pressure to explain where those rebels got their weapons from. And although it was, for me, it was absolutely clear that those rebels got their weapons from defectors, from the Ukrainian army, in reality, there was a lot of pressure to say that, no, they were receiving their weapons from Russia.
I'm not sure this is a debate today, but the information we got was clear enough and pictures and all that we had. It was very clear that the rebels got their information at that time from the defectors.
And did you have an opportunity to travel to Ukraine?
Then yes, of course, I had the opportunity to travel to Ukraine. On two capacities, in fact, because in 2014, you had the problem that the country started to split among those who spoke Russian and the others because the issue was language and you had a lot of Members of the Ukrainian Armed Forces were Russian-speaking who defected, simply. Meaning that suddenly you had within the Ukrainian Armed Forces, you had two problems. First of all, you started to have people leaving the armed forces and commanders losing their guys because they were just crossing the border. That was the first problem. Second, you had the lack of trust within the armed force themselves. And people didn't want to join armed forces anymore. You had a lack of trust. You had already forced recruitment and things like this. And that started to be difficult, to say the least, for the new authorities in Ukraine. And therefore, they started the Ukraine asked because Ukraine was member of the Partnership for Peace.
And under this framework nato helped ukraine to reform or restructure or yes something in between the ukrainian armed forces and in that capacity because Besides all my jobs, I'm also expert of the rule of law and reform of security institutions in the UN. So I was asked to join the NATO mission in Ukraine to find solution to reform the Ukrainian armed forces. And I had another opportunity because there was also a problem, especially in the Donbass region. Of the landmines and also these remnants of war, you know, those explosive remnants of war. And NATO started also an operation to demine or, you know, defuse those things. And I was then sent to Kiev to help the Ukrainian to set up a mission. To demine the the region of Donbass I'm not sure how far this went because soon after that you had the anti-terrorist operation starting and you had that was a little bit difficult in any case I I had the opportunity to go twice in in ukraine and to see the situation I was In particular, I was in Odessa in October, I think, 2014, at the time when the rebels created the United Forces of Novorossiya, because all the, not just the Donbass, but the whole southern part of Ukraine was rebelling against Kiev.
Very often when we talk about this period, people talk about the Donbass, but Donbass is the eastern, the far eastern part of Ukraine. In reality, at that time, Odessa is the southwestern part, if you look at the map. And you had the whole of the south of Ukraine that was rebelling. And incidentally, it's interesting because the flag they used for those unified This is a very similar flag as the Confederate States flag in the US. Very interesting. In any case, I remember that in Odessa, the situation was extremely tense. And because people were expecting that was exactly the time when the whole Ukrainian Black Sea Fleet just defected. The whole thing from the Admiral to the last sailor, they defected to the Russians. These are things nobody tells today, but that was the fact. So there was a lot of tension at that time and that I could measure a little bit the Let's say the mindset of the people in this deep crisis in which they were.
And you could see that a lot of people were sitting in between because all of them spoke Russian. You know, they were all speaking Russian. And you could see that they were split between their military duty because they were forced off under Kiev, basically. But you could feel that they were also Russian speaking. So I think it was a hard time for them, too. But that was a good experience for me as well.
Now, you finished your military career here in Brussels with NATO or with the Swiss government. Was it mandatory retirement or did you just decide that your time was up and it was time to start something new?
No, I was close to retirement and I decided to anticipate my retirement. I took one or two years before I decided to retire just one or two, maybe a year before, simply because I felt good here in Belgium. I made a lot of friends in the five years I have been there. The Belgians are very nice people. And I felt well here. So I said, well, if I go back in Switzerland for one or two years, they will give me just a kind of, you know, shitty job there. Probably because you cannot have a very interesting, I mean, you will not start a big project just one year before retirement or things like this. So I said, well, probably. It's a good idea to settle here. I have my friends here. Life is good. And well, there was no reason for me to go back. In addition to that, I had not been in Switzerland for decades before because I had all my time in Africa, the US and elsewhere. So I said, well, let's stay here.
So that's the reason why I settled here. And I'm not regretting my choice. This is, I think, that was a good choice. And I meet nice Belgian people. And therefore, yeah, I don't regret that.
Well, I can tell you what. The world owes you a debt of gratitude. I mean, it's amazing to listen to your life story, you know, what you've accomplished. You know, people, it's funny, people go through life living and things happen around us that we're unaware of, but they affect who we are, what we are. And when I think of the role that the United Nations played globally in peacekeeping, not just in Sudan, but you wrote the manuals that were used in other operations, you defined what civil military Affairs are, I can guarantee that your work in Sudan made its way to Fort Leavenworth has been incorporated into American doctrine as well. But, you know, you have made your mark on the world as not just, again, not just as an intelligence analyst, but an intelligence professional and a humanitarian. So it's just been an absolute honor and privilege to get to know you, to explore this with you.
And I just want to say on behalf of whoever's watching this, thank you very much for everything you've done. Really appreciate it. Thanks. Ladies and gentlemen, Jacques Baud, Swiss citizen, global citizen, but more importantly, a hero to humanity.